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Abstract 
In May 2012, Republican People’s Party (CHP) deputy Aylin Nazlıaka openly criticized 
the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) for attempting to ban abortion stating, “Prime 
minster [Erdoğan] should quit playing politics over women’s bodies…To put it in a 
nutshell…quit standing guard over women’s vaginas” (“Deputy PM argues…”). This illustrates 
Turkey’s most recent debate over women’s bodies, and has raised the question of women’s status 
in society.  
Although the party has initiated key domestic reforms, women contend the AKP 
continues to misrepresent their interests, namely the party’s conservative stance on preserving 
the traditional roles of women as mothers and wives. Though the AKP continues to pursue 
democratization and is still a candidate country for EU membership, the party also continues to 
encourage the secondary status of women through weak implementation of international and 
domestic reforms. The international community and women in Turkey are left to wonder what 
happened and why? 
In this thesis, I seek to understand the motivating factors behind the AKP’s shift of the 
political agenda and its impact on women in society. Through a quantitative and qualitative 
analysis of newspaper articles published during the AKP’s tenure (2002 to 2012) and interviews 
with local experts (academics) and activists, my research has revealed the party has indeed 
shifted toward a socially conservative agenda that aims to preserve the secondary-status of 
women. From my findings, I present the implications and impact of this shift on women in 
Turkey, its role in the development of the Third Wave of Feminism in Turkey, and finally its 
implications for burgeoning women’s movements in the Middle East and North Africa regions.  
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Introduction 
 On an international level, Turkey has committed itself to upholding the international 
standards of women’s rights through the support of Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in 1986 and the Additional Protocol to CEDAW in 
2000 (Rodriguez, 2009; 30). Additionally, Turkey continued to support the empowerment of 
women by lending its support to the Vienna Declaration and Program of Action (1993), 
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women (1993), and the Platform for Action 
of the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing (1995) (Rodriguez, 2009; 31).  
In 2002 the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power and continued its 
commitment toward improving women’s rights through its ratification of Optional Protocol to 
CEDAW. Throughout its three consecutive terms, the AKP has continued to support gender 
equality policies through landmark legislation. Beginning in 2002 the party oversaw several 
pivotal Constitutional amendments, including the 2004 amendment to Article 10 stating that 
“women and men have equal rights [and] the State [is] obliged to put this equality into effect” 
(Dedeoğlu, 2012; 125). The adoption of the new Civil Code (2001), Labor Law (2003), and 
Penal Code (2005) collectively functioned to ensure this renewed status of women (ibid., 
Dedeoğlu). In 2008, the AKP amended Law 4320 on the Protection of the Family and created 
more explicit provisions toward preventing domestic violence (Rodriguez, 2009). During that 
same year, the AKP fought to lift ban on headscarves in public universities to allow women to 
exercise greater freedom of expression.  
The aim of these reforms intended to legally recognize women as individuals outside 
their traditional roles as mothers and wives, and thus enable women to become more 
independent, self-sufficient citizens. Azer Kiliç, Ph.D. candidate at the Max Planck Institute for 
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the Study of Societies (MPIfG), described the result of these reforms as “changing the perception 
of women in society, where [this] shift in perception saw women move from being dependent 
citizens to independent participants in society” (Dedeoğlu, 2012; 126). To the international 
community, these international commitments and domestic reforms indicated a transformative 
shift in the status of women, moving women away from their secondary position in the home and 
family, and toward empowering women as active members of society. 
However, despite these international obligations and improved domestic legislation, 
women within society argue the AKP continues to misrepresent their interests. For example, 
amendments to Law 4320 have improved the personal freedoms of women on a legislative level, 
yet women contend this legislation excludes unmarried or divorced spouses from adequate 
protection, leaving women vulnerable to domestic violence. Though the government has initiated 
programs to increase the number of women’s shelters, the state has yet to provide adequate 
resources. In 2009 the Directorate General for the Social Services and Child Protection Agency 
cited there were only 14 women’s shelters listed in the whole country (Çarkoğlu, Asli, et al., 
2013; 49). A more recent report from 2012 estimated 79 shelters nationwide, but for a country of 
80 million this number is still extremely low (Bilefsky, 2013). With limited outside resources, 
rates of domestic violence and honor killings continue to be on the rise.  According to an article 
published by Hürriyet Daily News, the rate of domestic violence in Turkey increased nearly 70% 
between 2008 and 2011 (“Domestic violence,” 2012).  
Opportunities for women who seek to leave abusive homes or pursue independent 
lifestyles have also been thwarted by similarly weak legislation. The Social Security and General 
Health Insurance Amendment introduced in 2006 and finalized in 2008, aimed to ensure equal 
treatment of men and women in the retirement process, but ultimately restricted the conditions 
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for women’s retirement, and consequently discouraged women away from the labor market by 
taking away the “lure of a retirement benefit” (Arat, 2010; 871). Similarly, the 2003 Labor Law 
intended to encourage equal employment opportunity, treatment, and pay for women in the 
workforce, yet the rate of women in the work force remains below 25%, suggesting opportunities 
for women to work outside the home [remain] severely limited (ibid., Arat). Additionally, this 
legislation also intended to help women continue their careers after becoming mothers, yet an 
absence of promised child care and a father-as-breadwinner-mentality have made it more 
difficult for women to be working mothers. 
The most recent turn of events occurred in May 2012 when the state imposed regulations 
on Cesarean sections and then attempted to quietly ban abortion. While abortion has been legal 
in Turkey since 1983, this seemingly sudden attempt to ban the practice both baffled and enraged 
many women. Yet, concerns over the increasing rate of Cesarean sections began several months 
leading up to the official regulation, and which was then closely followed by the attempted 
abortion ban. The timing of both these events indicates neither was a coincidence, and suggests a 
decisive shift in government policy related to women.  
Despite being a signatory to numerous international obligations committed and domestic 
reforms, it appears the AKP has shifted toward a more socially conservative agenda committed 
to protecting the traditional roles of women. Given the picture presented above, a theme centered 
on the secondary-status of women has emerged, and subsequently triggered a domestic debate 
regarding the AKP’s position on women. After almost a decade of support toward improving the 
status of women, what is to account for this shift in policy and overall change in attitude? 
Initially, international pressures, compliance with European Union (EU) accession 
requirements and external pressure from the European community led the AKP to endorse 
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legislative improvement of the status and rights of women. The improved legislation during the 
first two terms of the AKP (2002-2008) suggested pivotal social improvements for the status and 
rights of women. However, the lack of enforcement during the party’s most recent term (2008-
2012) suggests women’s position in society remains at a standstill. Women contend the 
government politicized these issues in an effort to protect the familial role of women as mothers, 
and not as individuals. What is to account for the distinct change in the AKP’s political agenda 
toward women during the first two terms of the party and its most recent term?  
From a domestic perspective, institutional pressures from the secular elite (including 
Constitutional Court, military maintained, and secular deputies) and high EU incentives served 
as a check on the AKP during its first two terms. Though the AKP acted as a single-party, the 
will of the party was mitigated by the looming threat of closure by the Constitutional Court. Thus 
from 2002 to 2008 the AKP pursued economic reforms in compliance with EU requirements, 
and temporarily turned away from its social agenda. Yet by 2005, a decline in EU soft power 
was caused by public mistrust in the EU accession process. Furthermore, in 2011 the party’s won 
its third consecutive electoral victory, enabling the AKP to emerge as a dominant party and 
allowing it shift the political agenda toward a socially conservative agenda.  
Despite threats by the military in 2007 to close the party when Prime Minister chose then 
Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül as his candidate for president, and the 2008 attempt to close the 
AKP for “undermining Turkey’s secular state with a stealth agenda to impose Shari’a Law,” the 
AKP persevered, winning re-election in 2007 and 2011 (Boland, 2012). In short, from 2008 to 
2012 political discourse shifted away from EU driven reform, leading to increased public 
visibility of socially conservative issues, primarily issues related to women. Through its 
international commitments and domestic initiatives, the AKP increased the visibility of 
	   8	  
contentious issues related to women, including the nature of the headscarf controversy, the 
secondary status of women, restrictive reproductive regulations, and limited opportunities in the 
workforce.  However, since shifting the course of the political agenda, the AKP has displayed a 
decline in legislative reform related to improving the status of women. Compared to the 2002 to 
2004 period when EU incentives and leverage were still strong, the AKP has produced fewer 
reforms from 2005 regarding the status of women. It can be argued the AKP has in actuality 
produced more legislation limiting opportunities available to women, thus encouraging the 
secondary status of women.  
This thesis is divided into two parts and seven chapters. Part one will introduce the 
dynamic relationship between secularism and religion within the political realm, and how pivotal 
shifts in the political climate affected this relationship on a social level. Part one will explain the 
re-emergence of religion in the public sphere, which played a role in the politicization of women. 
Chapter one will begin with a political context, including the political history of Turkey to 
illustrate the fluidity of secularism and the re-emergence of religion in the public sphere. Chapter 
two will present the decline of religiosity and emergence of conservatism. More specifically, this 
chapter will address how the AKP used democratization to validate itself and the public presence 
of religion via social conservatism. Finally, this chapter will present the AKP’s strategic use of 
democratization to play within the political constraints set by the secular institutions of the state 
and to garner support from the EU and Western world. Chapter three will present the rise and 
development of the AKP, specifically the factors leading to the party’s rise as a dominant party. 
This chapter will address the waning leverage of the EU and the democratization process, which 
curbed the power and influence of the Constitutional Court and military, and thus enabled the 
AKP to shift toward its socially conservative agenda.  
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Part two will draw the connection between the party’s more adamant execution of its 
socially conservative agenda and its encroaching impact on the status of women. Chapter four 
will introduce the waves of feminism in Turkey. This chapter will focus on the how changing 
political climate affected the development of the women’s movement, and how this most recent 
shift has aided in the proliferation of the third wave of feminism. Through a content analysis of 
articles published from Hürriyet Daily News during the AKP’s tenure (2002 to 2012), chapter 
five will present the impact of the AKP’s socially conservative agenda on the status of women. 
This chapter will address recurring contentious issues relevant to women, including issues 
related to the headscarf, physical body, labor laws, political participation, and women’s rights. In 
chapter six, I will provide concluding remarks on the AKP’s socially conservative agenda and its 
impact on the status of women and the role of the third wave in Turkey’s democratization 
process. Finally, I will present implications for other feminist movements in the Middle East and 
North Africa regions that were affected by the Arab Spring and are transitioning towards 
democratization.    
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Literature Review 
Given the recent timing of this debate, there is limited scholarly work available that 
specifically addresses this emerging issue. However, recurring themes in Turkish politics of 
conservatism, political Islam, and controversy over women in society help create a framework to 
approach this debate. First, the concept of conservatism creates an understanding of the social 
and political domain in Turkey. Conservatism in the Turkish context refers to the revival of 
traditional, Islamic values as a means to improve the deficient government coalitions that 
characterized the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. Ali Çarkoğlu and Ersin Kalaycıoğlu (2009) outlined 
the series of events that led to the social origins of conservatism and its development in the 
political realm. While Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu explain conservatism on a broader level, this 
does not completely explain the motives behind the AKP’s recent actions toward women.    
A survey conducted by Hakan Yılmaz (2012) explored the social origins and impact of 
conservatism, and he found there are two variants of conservatism, political conservatism and 
social conservatism. Yılmaz’s findings revealed public demand for social conservatism was 
higher than demand for political conservatism. Simply, social conservatism seeks to apply 
traditional, Islamic values on a social level (e.g. gender relations and family life). Although 
Yılmaz’s work does not explicitly answer the question at hand, his findings rightfully suggest the 
AKP’s actions are indeed socially conservative in nature.  
In expanding the concept of social conservatism to women, most scholarly resources 
discuss the headscarf controversy of the 2000s. Angel Rabasa and F. Stephen Larrabee (2008) 
briefly describe the controversy and its relevance to the rise and development of political Islam. 
Similarly, Hilal Elver (2012) retells the controversy within the grand scheme of international 
politics, religion, and secularism. Though Saniye Dedeoğlu and Adem Y.  Elveren (2012) also 
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frame their work within the context of EU accession and political Islam, their work presents the 
headscarf controversy and issues related to gender equality. Dedeoğlu and Elveren assert 
legislative changes toward gender equality can be attributed to the influence international, yet 
domestic implementation remains slow toward protecting women’s rights.  
While these resources assemble the framework to answering why the AKP has shifted 
away from its international commitments to ensuring women’s rights, they do not fully address 
the AKP’s shift toward a socially conservative agenda as it relates to the status of women. This 
returns us to the recent debate over women’s bodies and subsequent question of women’s status 
in society. In this thesis I seek to understand the motivating factors behind the AKP’s shift of the 
political agenda and its impact on women in society. Through a quantitative and qualitative 
analysis of articles analysis of newspaper articles published by Hürriyet Daily News during the 
AKP’s tenure (2002 to 2012) and interviews with local experts (academics) and activists, my 
research has revealed the party has indeed shifted toward a socially conservative agenda that 
aims to preserve the secondary-status of women. From my findings, I present the implications of 
this shift on women in Turkey, its role in the development of the Third Wave of Feminism, and 
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Chapter 1 Historical Framework: The Foundations of Conservatism 
This chapter will present the rise of secularism under Atatürk and how religion became a 
state controlled entity. More importantly, this chapter will present how secular reform led by the 
Republican People’s Party (CHP) aimed to disconnect the Republic from its Ottoman past by 
relegating religion to the private sphere. Though these reforms effectively regulated the public 
presence of religion in urban areas, it also created greater distance between the urban elite and 
rural masses. As a result, the disconnect between the urban “center” and rural “periphery” 
became increasingly apparent, and ultimately led to transition from single-party rule to a multi-
party system.   
Under a multi-party system, political parties need to broaden their constituency beyond 
the urban elite and sought to engage the rural vote. Mostly unaffected by the Atatürk’s secular 
reforms, the rural masses still retained old-world values based in Islamic tradition. Thus, parties 
such as the Democrat Party (DP) increased public religiosity in an attempt to secure electoral 
victories. Though this strategy yielded the desired results, it also prompted secular elites to act 
against this perceived threat against the founding secular principles of the state. The closure of 
the DP for anti-secular activities (e.g. public religiosity endorsed by a state institution) set the 
tone for the future relationship between secular state institutions and the burgeoning Islamist 
movement.  
Finally, this chapter will present the impact of the 1980 military coup d’état and its role 
in the development of the Islamist movement, specifically addressing the after-effects of the 
1980 military coup d’état and how it laid the foundation for the emergence of conservatism. The 
rise of conservatism would go on to directly influence the rise of the AKP and social 
conservatism.  
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1.1 The Formative Years (1923-1950) 
In 1923 the leader of the Turkish independence struggle, Mustafa Kemal (later Atatürk), 
abolished the Sultanate, effectively ending the Ottoman Empire and replacing it with the 
Republic of Turkey. Atatürk sought to break away from the Ottoman past, and to modernize the 
new Republic through secular reform. The impact of World War I and the demise of the Ottoman 
Empire left the newly formed Republic economically distraught. Atatürk attributed the failing 
state of the country to the backwardness of the Islamic legacy left by the Ottoman regime, and 
asserted the only option for recovery was to become a Westernized state through progressive 
reform.  
For Atatürk and his party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), Islam posed the biggest 
threat to achieving the idealized goal of becoming a secular, westernized nation-state. Yet to 
completely abandon religion meant to negate a key facet of what defined a Turk (a Muslim, 
ethnic Turk who speaks Turkish) in this new nation state (İnce, 2012). Rather than completely 
abandon Islam, the state sought to control its influence in the public domain. Similar to the 
French concept of laïcité, the Turkish concept of laiklik subordinates religion to the control of 
the state. In contrast to the Anglo-Saxon concept of secularism, which calls for the separation of 
church and state, laiklik seeks to protect the state from the constraints of religion. Within the 
context of the Republic, Islam was seen as the buttress to the former power and status of the 
Ottomans, and to allow the public presence and influence of Islam to persist was 
counterproductive for Westernization. The concept of being secular was also reinterpreted within 
laiklik to refer to “a non-religious identity or one that cosigns religious beliefs to the private, 
rather than the public, realm” (White, 2008; 357). Thus within this framework, Kemalists as 
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secular actors institutionalized laiklik reforms to relegate the presence and influence of Islam 
from the public and political arena.   
Under laiklik, Islam became a state controlled entity both on a legal and popular level. 
According to Turkish law, religiously symbolic clothing was forbidden in public; religious 
specialists were not allowed to wear insignia of their office in the streets; civil servants and 
university students were not allowed to cover their heads, though veiling was not outlawed 
(White, 2008; 360). On a popular level the state closed brotherhoods, religious orders, convents, 
and sanctuaries in an effort to “severe links the masses had to popular Islam in the public 
domain” (Arat, 2005; 4). Kemalists understood the necessity of controlling the influence of Islam 
as a means of asserting the authority of the state. Historian Bernard Lewis described the aim of 
the state as “ to end the power of organized Islam and break its hold on the minds and hearts of 
the Turkish people,” and to replace Islam with the secular ideals of the state; in short, secularism 
“from its inception was intimately linked to state authority” (Arat, 2005; 4).   
Major Westernization reforms led by Atatürk included the adoption of the European civil, 
commercial and criminal codes of law, replacing Arabic script with the Latin alphabet and 
universally used numerals, adoption of the “originally Christian (but by then universal) calendar 
and working week,” and the implementation of European dress (Mango, 2008; 164). During this 
reform period, Atatürk also initiated reforms directed at improving the rights and status of 
women. Primarily geared toward urban, educated women, Kemalist elite used these women as 
“an ideological instrument to break the connection of Turkish society with Ottoman and Islam 
traditions within the reforms about women” (Özdemir, 2010; 109). Replicating social gender 
statues seen in Western Europe, reforms related to empowering women’s position in society 
were pursued in an attempt to complete Atatürk’s vision of a Westernized Turkey.  
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Among these reforms, women were granted the right to vote, obtain a divorce, and access 
to education. These reforms will be explained in more depth in later sections, but for the 
purposes of this section we conclude that Kemalist elites brought urban, educated women to the 
forefront of society to serve as evidence of Turkey’s progress toward Westernization. In other 
words, women became a reflection of modernization, and the presence of women outside the 
home as educated, career-oriented professionals indicated Turkey was indeed modernizing.  
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1.2 Decline of the CHP   
The authoritarian nature of the regime enabled Atatürk and the CHP to successfully carry 
out these reforms relatively unopposed. The CHP was established in 1923 coinciding with the 
abolishment of the Sultanate, and became the single permitted political party. In principle, 
Atatürk accepted party competition. However he opposed the possibility of competition leading 
group interest at the expense of the “general interest” (Ayan, 2010; 199). Thus, the CHP 
authoritarian regime came to dominate the political system, committing itself to upholding the 
general interest of the Republic, e.g. modernization. 
Alongside its modernization reforms, the Republican state also committed itself to the 
creation of a homogeneous nation-state. Through forced assimilation policies known as 
“Turkification” the state forced ethnic minorities such as the Kurds, Bosnians, Albanians, 
Circassians, and Arabs to surrender their culture, language and religion, and assimilate as 
“Turks” to gain full-citizenship (ibid., İnce). To be Turkish meant to an ethnic Turk, who 
practiced Islam and who spoke Turkish; and in this sense, the CHP politicized religion by 
requiring its citizens to be practitioners of Islam.  
The 1941 Wealth Tax (Varlık Vergisi) exacerbated religious differences by imposing 
fixed taxes. Though the explicit aim of the Wealth Tax was to raise funds for Turkey’s defense in 
case Turkey was required to enter World War II, the actual application of the tax severely 
diminished the economic power of non-Muslims including Jews, Greeks, and Armenians (Levi, 
1996). Those who were unable to pay these high taxes were arrested and sent to forced labor 
camps in eastern Turkey. During this period, 1941 Wealth Tax served as an example of the overt 
authoritarian nature of the CHP and the contentious nature of religion. The “general interest” the 
CHP committed itself to promoted modernization, but exercised authoritarian rule and 
	   17	  
implemented exclusionary policies. To fall outside the parameters of a Turk left one susceptible 
to state persecution.  
The exclusionary tendencies of the CHP also affected the rural masses who were 
considered Turks. Although secularization reforms were intended to modernize life throughout 
the Republic, these policies only extended to urban life, leaving rural areas untouched by 
secularism. Those living within rural communities were left unaddressed in Ataturk’s 
modernization project, subsequently marginalizing the majority of eastern Turkey. As the 
dominant elite became the urban, modern, secular “center,” the majority of the population in 
rural areas who lived traditional and pious lives was isolated to become the “periphery” 
(Larrabee, 2008; 33). This would later come back to hurt the CHP as emerging parties saw 
opportunity in the untouched rural vote. 
By 1945 and the end of World War II, authoritarian regimes became increasingly 
unpopular, thus several opposition parties emerged during this period including the Liberal 
Republican Party (SCF), National Development Party (MKP), and the Democrat Party (DP). As 
Turkey shifted toward a multi-party system, competition for votes from the untouched, rural 
constituency made Islam a “burning issue” and forced parties to readdress their religious policy 
(Ahmad, 2012). Public dissatisfaction with the CHP’s statism-based policies and stagnant nature 
of the economy created a lack of confidence in the party. Ultimately, the secular ideals of the 
CHP worked against the party. The CHP’s interference in religious life effectively alienated a 
significant number of the Muslim population, and created a disconnect between the CHP and its 
citizenry (Ahmad, 2012). By 1946 public discontent with the party and created an opportunity 
for the more liberal wing of the CHP to breakaway and establish the Democrat Party (DP). By 
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the 1950 elections the CHP and its secular idealism declined and the DP campaigned itself as 
viable alternative, which led the party to a landslide victory.  
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1.3 1950-1960: The Era of the Democrat Party   
The increasing presence of religious freedoms conflicted with the stringent boundaries 
between religion and politics set by the secular CHP. Leading up to the DP’s victory in 1950, 
religion made its way back into the public sphere in an attempt to capture the rural vote. By the 
time the DP took office religion had become an integral facet of the party’s agenda. A moderate-
right party, the DP adopted a more liberal interpretation of secularism to provide more religious 
freedoms to society, thus insuring its rural vote share. The increased religious freedoms gave 
greater visibility to religion on a social level through religious education and prayer, bringing the 
religion back into the public forum. During the DP’s first term, Prime Minister Adnan Menderes 
and President Celal Bayar permitted broadcasting of religious programs and readings of the 
Qur’an on the radio and religious education became compulsory (Ahmad, 2012).  The rising 
threat of communism furthered aided the reintegration of Islam into the public domain. The 
Director of Religious Affairs Ahmed Hamdi Akseki declared “Islam rejects communism 
absolutely, its ideology in any form and all its practices. Faith and spirit are the most powerful 
weapons against communism. It is not possible for a genuine believer to reconcile himself to the 
ideas and practices of communism” (ibid., Ahmad). During the first term of the DP, religion 
resurfaced through government initiatives, which conflicted with the stringent boundaries 
between religion and politics. 
In 1954 the DP won re-election. Though the DP sought to increase its vote share by 
improving religious liberties, the party’s victory can be attributed to its liberal, laissez-faire 
policies, “which initially brought the country prosperity as well as a great sense of dynamism and 
hope” (ibid., Ahmad). However, as economic conditions began to slow down the DP became 
more dependent on its religious constituents for votes. The DP heavily invested in mosques, 
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spending 37.5 million liras (over thirteen million dollars) in seven years while the CHP had only 
spent 6.5 million liras in its twenty-seven years in office (ibid., Ahmad).  
 Unfortunately this emphasis on religious policy did not give DP its desired boost in the 
polls, and the party’s vote share decreased from 56.6 percent in 1954 to 47.3 percent in 1957 
(ibid., Ahmad). As the DP’s poor economic performance became apparent in the steady decline 
of the economy, the party attempted to retain its vote share through increased religious activities. 
Yet by 1958 the lira devalued by almost four hundred percent, devastating the economy (ibid., 
Ahmad). Though for the most part the military stayed out of the DP’s way, increasing religiosity 
raised serious concerns, as the secular elite perceived as a threat to revert to an Islamic state. The 
military was finally forced to act when Menderes’ attempted to abolish the CHP.  
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1.4 The Decline of the DP  
Distraught by economic turmoil, fear of returning to single-party rule, and possibility of 
reinstating Islamic law, the military finally stepped in. The 1960 military coup d’état was 
welcomed by the people as the military was seen as an “impartial, nonpartisan, trustworthy 
element of the state, and one dedicated to protecting citizens” (Harris, 2011; 203). Thus, many of 
the people welcomed the 1960 military coup as “a move to save the state” (ibid., Harris). The 
outcomes of the 1960 coup lead to the banning of the DP for violating the secular founding 
principles of the nation. More importantly, the coup led to the implementation of the 1961 
Constitution, which enabled a system of checks and balances to prevent any future threats to the 
state. Among these institutional checks was the creation of the Constitutional Court, which was 
given the authority to “invalidate laws that were seen to contravene the constitution,” and the 
establishment of the National Security Council (NSC) “to give the military a forum to share their 
views with civilian authorities” (Harris, 2011; 204). The roles of the Constitutional Court and 
NSC gained increased oversight and power with later coups.  
The decline of the CHP to the closure of the DP characterized the resurgence of Islam in 
the public and political domain. The transition to a multi-party system and subsequent decline of 
the CHP expanded the democratization process by opening the political arena to “religious and 
ethnic groups” who had been marginalized by the CHP (Larrabee, 2008; 37). This incentivized 
competition among political parties for the rural vote through increased visibility of religion. 
After the closure of the DP, Islam had re-integrated itself into the public and political life, 
creating a space for religious groups to resurface and organize (ibid., Larrabee). However, the 
DP’s closure also served as a warning to moderate parties with religious leanings.  
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1.5 After the DP: The Era of the National Security Council    
Following the closure of the DP, the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s were characterized by the 
rise of leftist parties and high political instability. During the 1970s, two distinctively Islamist 
parties were formed by industrialist, Necmettin Erbakan, and his associates. In 1970 the National 
Order Party was founded with a strong religious orientation. The National Order Party avoided 
confrontation with the National Security Council until 1971 when economic and social chaos 
caused the NSC to initiate a second coup. During this time, the Islamist movement began to gain 
some momentum. Perhaps emboldened by this, the National Order Party publicly denounced 
rejected Atatürk and Kemalism (Ahmad, 1993). Shortly after the National Order Party was 
banned for violating the secular principles of the constitution.  
Undeterred by his close call with the military, Erbakan went on to establish the National 
Salvation Party, which endorsed a similar platform focused on public morals and virtue. The 
National Salvation Party found success as a minor party, winning parliamentary seats in the 1973 
and 1977 elections, which gained the party considerable power in several coalition governments 
(Mecham, 2004; 341).  
However, by the late 1970s civil unrest and political violence between left-wing and 
right-wing organizations led to the military junta to intervene in politics once again. The 1980 
coup d’état reinstalled martial law for the third time in Turkish history. In 1983, the civilian 
government was restored with the 1982 constitution, which was designed to eliminate politicians 
and parties of the 1970s from participating in politics. The NSC purged parties from the 1970s, 
claiming it was necessary to protect Kemalist traditions from religious based parties (such as the 
National Salvation Party) that threatened the unity of the secular state.  
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1.6 Development of Political Islam & Conservatism: The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis  
The 1980 coup d’état and the subsequent military reign was seen as a harsh response to 
rising tensions and violence of the 1970s between left-wing and right-wing organizations. In an 
effort to “suppress communists, socialists, social democrats, and left-of-center politicians, 
intellectuals, and voters,” the military junta promoted a new ideology called the Turkish-Islamic 
Synthesis. The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis was designed to curb the appeal of leftist ideologies 
and limit the influence of “non-Turkish strands of Islamic thinking from Pakistan and the Arab 
world” (Larrabee, 2008; 37). Employing the legacy of Ataturk’s laiklik, the military sought to 
institute a state-controlled process of “‘Islamization from above’” by fusing Islamic symbols 
with nationalism to create a “more homogeneous and less political Islamic community and to 
insulate the population from the influence of left-wing ideologies” (ibid., Larrabee).  
To legitimize the hegemony of the new ruling elite, a new ideology was created to 
include facets of Ottoman, Islamic, and Turkish popular culture (Larrabee, 2008; 38). Once again 
bringing Ataturk’s notions of the family as the state, engineers of this new ideology used 
Ottoman-Islamic ideas to “cement differing interests by emphasizing the danger to family, 
nation, and state posed by ideological fragmentation” (ibid., Larrabee). Beginning in the early 
1980s, Islamic (Sunni) and ethnic Turkish nationalist ideals were systematically promoted in the 
media and religious education in schools. Though the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis successfully 
deterred the influence of leftist ideology, it inadvertently strengthened the role of religion and 
weakened the emphasis on secularism (ibid., Larrabee). Through this synthesis the military junta 
ironically created a space for Islamists to organize, expand, and develop their own message.  
 Following the end of martial law in 1983, the civilian government under Prime Minister 
Turgut Özal showed greater tolerance to religion through reforms by including granting greater 
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freedoms to Muslims to finance religious schools and creating greater political space for 
emerging Islamic-based groups. Under these reforms, Islamic-based groups gained access to 
media outlets and newspaper chains that aided in propagating their message to a wider audience 
(Mardin, 2005).  
Additionally, the influx of rural migrants to urban areas expanded the Islamic-based 
audience. The rural migrant population served as an important constituency base for Islamic-
based groups because both opposed Westernization and globalization. As part of Turkey’s on-
going industrial and modernization policies, rural migrants left their homes to pursue work and 
better futures. The majority of migrants faced challenges in integrating within urban culture, and 
continued to function as the “periphery” to the urban “center.” The close proximity between the 
“center” and “periphery” exacerbated social tensions throughout the 1980s.  
 The economic decline of the 1980s deepened public mistrust in the government and 
fueled support for emerging Islamist parties. During this time, Turkey shifted from a state-led 
mixed economy and toward a liberal capitalist, modern market economy, which appeared 
promising as state-initiated liberalization averted recession at the time. However, this was short 
lived as economic liberalizations, relaxation of government controls and regulations over 
domestic and foreign trade, and privatization soon left the masses at an economic disadvantage 
(Çarkoğlu, 2009). The liberal economic policies of the 1980s continued into the early 1990s, and 
the failure of the Right Path Party (DYP)-Social Democratic Populist Party (SHP) government to 
produce viable economic policy led Turkey into an economic recession.  
Public frustrations over economic hardship continued as the 1994 financial crisis 
worsened the recession, forcing the coalition government to adopt an austerity program. For the 
masses, “the laissez-faire liberal policies of the moderate left and right had become associated 
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with corruption as big corporations and propertied classes,” that led to the sharp depreciation of 
the Turkish lira, which skyrocketed consumer prices that  “pauperized” small business owners  
(Çarkoğlu, 2009; 20) Increasing public dissatisfaction over the failing state of the economy and 
corruption within the state led to “a popular call for morality, fairness, justice, and decency in 
socioeconomic interactions” and clean politics (ibid., Çarkoğlu). This initiated a strong demand 
to revive traditional values in society.  
Turkish historian Kemal Karpat described the shift toward conservatism in the 1990s as 
“stress[ing] adherence to religious values, and social customs and traditions” (Çarkoğlu, 2009; 
24). For the masses, conservatism meant solidarity based shared experiences and heritage, which 
were all derived from a shared religion of Islam. The dimensions of conservatism expressed 
nostalgia for the traditions and values of the Ottoman past. Though the public continues to reject 
the Ottoman system, it also continues to hold its tradition close. Ali Çarkoğlu, professor from 
Sabancı University, described this nostalgia as a “clearly intangible and idealized lifestyle of 
core values reflected in customs and traditions…[that] called for a return to the realm of old 
values” (Çarkoğlu, 2009; 91). Conservatism in this sense does not reflect a demand for 
institutional change, but a regression to traditional values for improved treatment and expansion 
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1.7 Overview of Conservatism  
While the Western notion of conservatism is based on political or theological concepts 
denoting the preservation of society and the opposition of radical changes, Turkish conservatism 
emerged as a means of protest against the ineffective government system and called for a revival 
of old world values. This form of conservatism is distinct in the sense it did not defend the 
political order or institutions that existed from the 1960s to the 1990s; rather it sought to improve 
the government system through Islamic-based values and traditions.  
 Though conservatism in the Western and Turkish context both adhere to notions of 
preservation, Turkish conservatism is understood as preserving cultural and religious values 
within governmental institutions to deter corruption and to ensure economic efficiency. As 
conservatism of the late 1990s under the Welfare Party suggested Turkey would revert to an 
Islamic state, secularists began to crack down on Islamists. Though secularists successfully 
eliminated anti-system parties, the crackdown inadvertently aided in the rethinking of the 
Islamist movement, and lead to the rise of the AKP and social conservatism in the early 2000s. 
A survey conducted by by Hakan Yılmaz from 2005 to 2006 titled “Major Variants of 
Conservatism in Turkey” found political and social conservatism were the two most prominent 
forms of conservatism identified by the public (Yılmaz, 2010). Yılmaz found political 
conservatism was defined by the public as “new nationalism marked by anti-Western sentiments, 
primarily Euroskepticism and anti-American feelings, purporting to ‘conserve’ the nation state 
and national values in the face of Europeanization and globalization” (Yılmaz, 2010; 59). In 
contrast, social conservatism was defined as an “Islamic variety geared at conserving the 
religious regulatory mechanism in the area of sexuality, gender relations, and family values” 
(ibid.,Yılmaz). Though one may assume Turkish society considers political conservatism more 
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important than social conservatism, Yılmaz found this to be the opposite. In other words, Yılmaz 
found there is little public demand for institutional restructuring in the political arena; rather, 
there is a demand for change on a social level. According to Yılmaz’s findings, key points in 
public demands include the “protection of family; change [in] the economy; ensure political 
stability; and, make us a member of the EU without sacrificing our national customs and 
traditions”(ibid., Yılmaz). The emergence of social conservatism influenced the development of 

















	   28	  
Chapter 2 The Rise and Development of the AKP 
 With the emergence of conservatism, it became clear the once rural “periphery” 
successfully integrated itself within urban, modern life, and began reacting against the illiberal 
nature of the political left. The increased presence of public conservatism allowed the Islamist 
movement to gain a stable foothold in government. In the 1990s, conservative ideological 
preferences allowed Erbakan’s Welfare Party to enter office. However, Welfare’s brand of 
conservatism provoked secular elites to close the party for anti-secular activities. Following the 
closure of Welfare, affiliates of the party went on to establish the Virtue Party in an attempt to 
re-enter politics.  
 In an effort to differentiate itself from its predecessor, Virtue employed a pragmatic 
strategy by moving away from overt religiosity and anti-systematic rhetoric and toward 
democratization. Though this strategy allowed Virtue to participate in politics, controversy 
eventually led to the party’s closure for anti-secular activities. However, the adoption of a more 
pragmatic strategy set a pivotal precedent in the Islamist movement, and went on to influence the 
development and strategy of the AKP.     
 With a pragmatic approach, the AKP was able to enter, survive, and thrive within the 
political sphere by appealing to “the hearts and minds” of its religious and non-religious 
constituency through its viable economic policies and socially conservative values (ibid., Arat, 
2005). This chapter will introduce the impact of institutional constraints on the rise and demise 
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2.1 Paving the Way for the AKP: The Rise and Fall of the Welfare and Virtue Party  
 In the 1980s, Erbakan established the Welfare Party and re-entered politics. To avoid 
another banning, Erbakan re-defined his new movement as a party for radical change” and 
committed itself to social justice, as opposed to the “‘conservative’ religious movement” that 
defined the National Salvation Party (Mecham, 2004; 341). This allowed Welfare to broaden its 
support. Populist support from the urban poor and grassroots organizations headed by volunteer 
women further strengthened the party.1  
By 1991 Welfare won a position in the coalition government. In 1991, Welfare captured 
17% of the vote, and the party continued to increase its vote share in 1994 securing over 21% of 
the vote (ibid., Mecham). Though other parties attempted to create a coalition government that 
would exclude Welfare’s power, their efforts were unsuccessful. In 1996, Erbakan became 
Turkey’s first Islamist prime minister. Although Erbakan learned to play within the 
constitutional redlines set by the military, the Welfare ideology was characterized as anti-system 
and party leadership exuded strong religious tones. Additionally, Welfare’s campaign for “Just 
Order” promoted increased religiosity, leading the Constitutional Court to become suspicious of 
the party.   
 By 1997, the 28 February Process sowed the seeds of Welfare’s demise.2 The National 
Security Council sought to force Erbakan’s hand with demands that would delegitimize Welfare 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Women were among the Welfare Party’s largest group of supporters who played an instrumental role in 
recruitment. Though women with religious backgrounds supported Welfare, the women who worked to 
mobilize the party came from secular backgrounds (Arat, 2005; 9). According to Arat, these women 
moved beyond the religious/non-religious boundaries for the personal satisfaction they received from 
fostering “solidarity, comradeship, and patriotism”  (Arat, 2005; 10). 
2 Preceding the 28 February Process, Erbakan’s foreign and domestic policies were too overtly religious 
for the National Security Council. For example, upon entering office Erbakan attempted to establish an 
economic bloc of Muslim countries (D-8) and controversy over Erbakan’s Ramadan dinner invitation to 
leaders of religious brotherhoods (Mecham, 2004; 343). Finally, the NSC saw the restrictions on alcohol 
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and its Islamist supporters. These demands included “the closure of hundreds of religious 
schools, tight controls over religious brotherhoods, and restrictions on Islamic dress” (Mecham, 
2004; 344). Though Erbakan conceded, the military continued to issues threats against the party, 
and galvanized society and media through an “anti-Islamic drive” (ibid., Mecham). By January 
1998, Welfare was formally closed. Through the 28 February Process, secular institutions 
imposed stringent constraints against Islamists groups with an overt Islamic agenda to survive. 
As a result, the Islamist movement was forced to rethink itself once again.  
 Soon after the closure of Welfare, Islamists close to Erbakan went on to found the Virtue 
Party. Virtue made a conscious effort to emphasize it was “not just the Welfare Party under a 
new name,” but a new, pro-democratic party (ibid., Mecham). The strong institutional constraints 
of the National Security Council and Constitutional Court, and recent closure of Welfare further 
incentivized Virtue leadership to differentiate itself from its predecessor. In contrast to Welfare’s 
anti-system attitudes and ideology, Virtue adopted a more democratic agenda to appease the 
secular elites.  
Among its principle messages, Virtue promoted the necessity of real democracy in 
Turkey, the importance of human rights, and a focus on expanding political liberties (ibid., 
Mecham). Despite its efforts, the Constitutional Court was already suspicious of Virtue and 
mistrustful of Erbakan’s presence in the party. Divisions within Virtue between the old guard 
Erbakan supporters and the vanguard reformists began to cause a rift in the party. Controversy 
and anti-democratic moves sealed Virtue’s fate and the party was banned for anti-secular activity 
and remaining an extension of the banned Welfare Party (ibid, Mecham).  From the remnants of 
Virtue emerged the Erbakan’s Felicity Party (SP) and the AKP. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
sales, increased spending on mosque construction, and changes in landmarks to give a more religious tone 
as infringements upon the secular foundation of the state (ibid., Mecham).	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2.2 The AKP Strategy: Conservative Democracy   
The closure of Welfare and Virtue had significant influence over the development of the 
AKP in terms of organization and political strategy. With Welfare and Virtue controversies still 
fresh in the minds of the public and secular elite, the fledgling AKP was faced with the challenge 
of succeeding where Virtue failed. Institutional constraints, including the possibility military 
intervention and fear of closure by the Constitutional Court, threatened the party’s political 
survival. In addition to this, a need to maintain and expand the AKP’s electoral base weighed on 
the party’s shoulders.   
Following the split from Welfare, the Felicity Party and the AKP took two different 
approaches. While the Felicity Party remained under Erbakan’s leadership, the AKP distanced 
itself from its Virtue past and established itself as a center-right party. As a center-right party the 
AKP directly responded to institutional constraints and democratic incentives. By moving away 
from the radical right reputation of Virtue and the Felicity offshoot, the AKP determined its 
position as a center-right party would not solicit military confrontation. Second, the party was 
motivated by democratic incentives, “recognizing the majority of Turks had consistently voted 
for centrist parties” (Mecham, 2004; 354). By creating a balance between “behaving like a 
religious protest party and brandishing secular credentials,” the party could broaden its support 
base beyond its religious constituency to include the more liberal votes (ibid., Mecham).    
In breaking away from the old guard ranks of the Virtue Party, the AKP was able to 
establish itself as a formidable opponent, opting for a populist style agenda that would serve the 
interests of the secular elite and the party’s religious constituency. Party leader Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan announced the AKP would work to serve as a “bridge between traditional and 
modernizing Turkey” by pushing for a transition to a market economy and Turkey’s admission 
into the European Union (ibid., Mecham). The party described itself as a group of conservatives 
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whose agenda promulgated neo-liberal economic policy and democratic reform that sought to 
enhance personal freedoms and liberties. Within this framework the AKP protected itself from 
military confrontation, broaden its constituency, and supported democratic freedoms that enabled 
the expression Islamic faith, lifestyle, and identity in the public sphere.  
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2.3 Switching Camps: The Anti- and Pro- EU Blocs   
The AKP’s moderate position and avid support for democratization and EU accession 
further legitimized the party in the eyes of its new constituency and the international community.  
In striking a balance between adhering to the secular principles of the Constitution while also 
appeasing the party’s more religious constituency, the AKP adopted the Anglo-Saxon concept of 
secularism to endorse EU accession. Whereas the Turkish laiklik aimed to control and privatize 
religion, the Anglo-Saxon understanding enabled AKP leaders to support the foundations of 
secularism but also contest state interference in people’s private lives (Patton, 2007; 343).  
Although throughout Turkey’s history Kemalists and secular elite stood as at the helm of 
modernization and integration into Europe, further democratization threaten their institutional 
stronghold over religion. The AKP argued “this formulation [was] incompatible with democratic 
norms and individual rights-based freedoms that all Turkish citizens deserve to enjoy” (ibid., 
Patton). The AKP officially endorsed these democratic norms and goal of EU accession through 
its support of the Copenhagen Criteria, which states “membership requires that a candidate 
country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human 
rights and respect for and protection of minorities” (Avci, 2011; 411).  
However for Kemalists and secularists, the Copenhagen Criteria demanded reforms 
“guaranteeing individual and minority rights” were perceived as “a ready-made breeding ground 
for Islamic fundamentalism and separatist terrorism” (Patton, 2007; 341). This moment gave way 
to a pivotal change within the secularist-Islamists dynamic: as Islamists (as led by the AKP) 
abandoned their rejectionist stance on EU integration, Kemalists and secularists renounced their 
pro-EU position. As the AKP used its new pro-EU position to broaden its domestic appeal and 
gain international approval, the party’s legitimacy became contingent on the accession process. 
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Thus, the AKP had high incentives to ensure successful integration. If the party reneged, its 
claims as a proponent of democracy would be unfounded and leave the AKP vulnerable to 
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Chapter 3 The Political Dominance of the AKP 
 Through its commitment to the EU accession process, democratization, and liberal 
economic policies, the AKP truly appealed to the “hearts and minds” of its broad constituency 
(ibid., Arat). First, by adopting a center-right position, the AKP appealed to the conservative 
ideological preferences of the masses. Second, the party’s viable economic strategy delivered the 
state from its once distraught economic conditions to a major manufacturing and export player in 
the global market. Most importantly, the AKP was able to overcome institutional constraints 
through democratization, which curbed the power of the judiciary and military. This effectively 
allowed the AKP to loosen institutional constraints. 
 Although the EU accession process validated the AKP’s presence in politics, public 
support for EU accession began to wane as incentives declined. As EU-driven reforms required 
Turkey to concede on politically sensitive issues such as the Cyprus issue and cultural rights for 
the Kurds, Sèvres syndrome resurfaced among the masses and fueled increasing nationalist 
sentiments .3 Instead of abandoning its EU commitment, which would have effectively de-
legitimize the AKP, the party chose to not actively pursue or implement EU driven reforms as it 
did in the past. These efforts allowed the AKP to consolidate its power by increasing its vote 
share from 2002 to 2007 and 2007 to 2011.With its rise to political dominance, the party was 
able to move away from EU reforms and toward its own agenda.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Sèvres syndrome describes the impact of the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres on the formation and development 
of the Turkish state. The treaty partitioned the Ottoman Empire establishing land holdings for Armenians 
and added Greek-speaking parts of Thrace and the Aegean coats to Greece. Defeated by World War I, the 
division of Anatolia left Turkey humiliated and led to Ataturk’s creation of the modern state. In short, 
Sèvres syndrome describes the lingering threat of external forces dismembering what Turks perceive is 
their rightful national territory (Hovsepyan, 2012). 
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  This chapter will introduce how the AKP’s rise to political dominance and the declining 
influence of the EU enabled the party to shift away from its economic agenda and toward 
pursuing its social agenda. 
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3.1 EU Conditionality and Political Incentives  
 Since Turkey received candidate status in the 1999 Helsinki Summit, EU conditionality 
has played a decisive role in AKP reform policy. For Turkey, EU conditionality offered “rational 
incentives for domestic actors to undertake reforms in expectation of the credible perspective of 
EU membership” (Avci, 2011; 410). In other words, if Turkey were to complete the required 
Copenhagen Criteria, full member status into the EU would be achieved. EU conditionality is 
based on two factors: the consistency in EU’s official application of conditionality, and the 
credible membership perspective.4 So long as Turkey continued to comply with the democratic 
reforms (especially the political criteria), then integration into the EU would follow soon after. 
Thus, the EU simultaneously signaled the necessity of democratization to membership, as well as 
threatened exclusion if Turkey did not fully comply with the required criteria (Saatçioğlu, 2011; 
25).  
The period following 1999 Helsinki Summit was marked by high incentive, high 
credibility for accession. Following the AKP’s first electoral victory in 2002, the party initiated a 
strong reform period from 2002 to 2004. Among these reforms included “abolishment of the 
death penalty, the extension of minority rights to the Kurds, and broader definitions of freedom 
of association and expression, as well as bringing the Penal Code in line with European norms” 
(ibid., Avci). However, pressing domestic and international issues left the EU uncertain of 
Turkey’s place in the European community. The increasing political violence by the Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party (PKK) and the Cyprus issue in particular left the EU uneasy. These events also 
led to increasing nationalist sentiments, leaving Turkey uncertain if the EU was somewhere the 
state wanted to be.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Frank Schimmelfennig and his colleagues developed the original argument of conditionality; their work 
was published in 2005 (Avci, 2011; 410).   
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In 2004, the Cyprus issue was brought to the table when the AKP willingly proposed the 
Annan Plan as an internationally acceptable solution to alleviate the Cyprus dispute. Though 
Cyprus endorsed the proposal, the majority of the Greek Cypriots rejected the referendum. Soon 
after, Cyprus gained EU membership, leaving the AKP disappointed with the EU for not 
pressuring Greek Cyprus and for not following through on sending economic aid to the Turkish 
Cypriots (ibid., Avci). Although Turkey conceded to Cyprus by proposing a viable solution for 
both parties, the EU did not back Turkey’s initiative, but instead pressured Turkey to 
compromise, which “facilitated in the role of Cyprus as a veto player” (Avci, 2011; 413)  
The EU’s uncompromising pressure on Turkey to concede to Cyprus fostered paranoia 
promulgated by militant extremists, which included right-wing Turkish ethno-nationalists and 
anti-western, anti-imperialists from the left (Patton, 2007). Sèvres Syndrome resurfaced with full 
force, and its spread was further facilitated by the CHP and the ultra-nationalist MHP.  In 
addition to this, the EU’s continued push for cultural rights for the Kurds provoked a strong 
reaction from nationalists who asserted these reforms, “weakened the Turkish state [by making 
it] impossible to effectively fight terrorism and encouraged Kurdish separatism” (Patton, 2007; 
346). The threat of terrorism was especially relevant at this time as the Iraqi war strengthened the 
likelihood of an independent Iraqi Kurdistan, thus threatening the resurgence of the PKK in 
Turkey. By 2005, the PKK re-launched its violent campaign, and reinforced the burgeoning 
nationalist position. 
 Nationalist sentiments continued to rise as EU credibility began to fall in 2004 when 
accession negotiations opened and member states voiced alternatives to full membership. 
Preceding the 2004 Brussels Summit, the Christian Democratic Union led by Angela Merkel 
“[pledged] to block Turkey’s full membership prospect if [CDU] assumed power in 2005;” 
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France and Austria also insisted on a “privileged partnership” as opposed to full membership 
(Saatçioğlu, 2011; 31). Though the 2004 Brussels Summit reaffirmed Turkey’s candidate status, 
the reactions of member states to Turkey’s seemingly imminent membership left Turkey 
uncertain of EU credibility, as well as raised suspicions of Europeans wanting to keep the EU as 
a “Christian Club” (Patton, 2007; 345). The 2005 Negotiating Framework signaled, “Turkish 
membership would be extremely difficult, and if Turkey was granted membership it would be 
second-class status” (Saatçioğlu, 2011; 26). By December 2006, membership prospects 
continued to fall further as a partial freeze in membership negotiations. Despite completing the 
necessary requirements to open negotiations, the EU continues to block talks, further slowing the 
accession process.  
The strong reform period that characterized 2004 began to wane as the EU’s inconsistent 
application of conditionality and absence of credible membership left the AKP feeling shorted by 
double-standard treatment and one-sided negotiations. Erdoğan stated that the outcome of the 
2004 Brussels Summit showed Turkey was being judged by a different standard. Erdoğan stated 
Turkey continued to be “faced with tougher criteria compared to other candidate countries” and 
despite fulfilling the necessary requirements, “the Europeans [were still] hesitating” (Saatçioğlu, 
2011; 29). Following the 2004 period and the 2005 ECHR decision, public Euro-skepticism 
based on the failing credibility of full EU membership began to dissuade the public and de-
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3.2 Moving Toward a Dominant Party System: The AKP’s Rise to Dominance   
Despite the slowing down of the EU accession process, the AKP continued to increase its 
vote share. Since capturing its first electoral victory in 2002, the AKP has emerged as the 
dominant, single party in government. Winning the 2002 elections with 34.3%  of the popular 
vote, the AKP emerged as a single party government with 363 of the 550 seats in parliament 
(Arat, 2010; 871). The party’s won re-election in 2007 with 47% of the popular vote and 340 
seats in parliament (Arat, 2010; 872). The party went on to win a third consecutive term in 2011 
with its largest vote share of 48.9% of the popular vote and secured 327 seats in parliament 
(Çarkoğlu, 2011; 45).  With its three consecutive electoral victories, the AKP has been able to 
retain and consolidate its position in power. Unlike the Democrat Party, the AKP was able to 
increase its popular vote share from each election (Ciddi and Esen, 2011;15). The emergence of 
the AKP as the dominant, single party in government has played a pivotal role in shifting the 
political agenda. 
In determining the AKP’s dominance, Çarkoğlu conducted an electoral analysis based on 
the Satori model.5 According to this model, three defining characteristics determine dominant 
parties in a competitive parliamentary system: 1) “vote or seat shares in representative 
assemblies obtained by the party in the system;” 2) “the nature of the opposition against such 
parties;” and 3) “the time-span over which these parties acquire a certain majority of votes and 
seats”  (Çarkoğlu, 2011; 44).  
Çarkoğlu’s findings determined that the AKP has indeed met these requirements outlined 
by Satori. First, the AKP has fulfilled the first requirement simply by retaining its seats in 
government. To obtain seats in parliament, parties must meet a 10% threshold. The 10% 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 According to Çarkoğlu, the Satori model provides a “clear operationalization” and explains that three 
consecutive electoral victories are criteria to qualify a party system as dominant (ibid., Çarkoğlu).  
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threshold was initiated in an effort to prevent multi-party coalitions and to end high 
fragmentation that characterized the 1960s and 1970s (ibid., Çarkoğlu). According to Satori, a 
“10 percentage point spread between the stronger and the other parties suffices for it to qualify as 
a dominant party”  (Çarkoğlu, 2011; 45). Second, the AKP overcame the fragmented nature of 
Turkish politics by remaining a single party; this allowed the party to concentrate on broadening 
its geographic reach. This is evident in the AKP’s electoral victory margin over the CHP, which 
was about 15 percentage points in 2002 and then it increased to about 25 in 2007, and was about 
24 percentage points in 2011  (ibid., Çarkoğlu). Furthermore, the results of the June 2011 general 
elections gave the AKP its third consecutive electoral victory, satisfying Satori’s third 
requirement of time. Thus, it can be concluded the AKP sufficiently fulfills the requirements to 
be considered a dominant party.  
 The sustained dominance of the AKP can be attributed to several reasons, namely its 
ability to overcome institutional constraints; its viable economic policies and successes; and 
finally, the party’s conservative ideological position. First, the AKP was able to overcome 
institutional barriers when it first entered politics in 2002 by establishing itself as a center-right 
party. More importantly, in 2008 the party survived constitutional closure. The 2008 closure case 
against the AKP was sparked by the headscarf controversy. The Chief Public Prosecutor of the 
Court of Cassation started prohibition proceedings against the AKP for prompting anti-secular 
activity (Hale, 2010;74). The party was accused of infringing on the founding secular principles 
of the constitution through its attempt to introduce its 2007 constitutional referendum, which 
would have allowed for the lifting of the headscarf ban in universities in addition to other 
controversial changes.6  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 According to article 175 of the 1982 constitution, if any amendment receives over 367 parliamentary 
votes (two-thirds of 550), the president can choose to send the amendment back for reconsideration, 
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Among these amendments, the most controversial changes would affect the composition 
and appointment of the judiciary (primarily the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Board of 
Prosecutors and Judges) and removing special privileges from the military, which would make it 
more difficult to close political parties (Ciddi, 2011). The outcome of the referendum would 
effectively curb the powers of the military and judiciary, thus loosening the looming threat of 
closure. The approval of the referendum would also allow Turkey to comply with the EU 
democratic requirements and to move forward with the accession process. While the 2008 
closure case stalled the referendum, in 2010 it was sent to a public vote and 58% voted “yes” for 
the constitutional amendments. Since winning re-election in 2011, the AKP has prioritized the 
promulgation of a new constitution (ibid., Ciddi).  
Second, the factionalized history of Turkish politics and economic hardships heavily 
influenced the AKP’s economic policies. The preceding coalition was unable to prevent the 2001 
economic crisis, which led to steep drop in GDP and a spike in unemployment.7 The AKP was 
able to win the 2002 elections because it presented itself as a viable alternative by appealing to 
“the economic demands of its grassroots supporters and offered policies that promoted growth in 
a market economy and globalization” (Hale, 2010;100). The 2002 and 2007 economic platforms 
encouraged a move toward capitalism, focusing on the service sector and privatizing larges state 
industries geared toward manufacturing and exports as well as integrating Turkey into the global 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
submit it to a national referendum, or sign it into a law. If the proposal receives between 330 and 367 
votes (three-fifths and two-thirds majority), the president can choose to call it a national referendum or 
send it back to parliament for reconsideration. However, if the proposal goes to a public referendum, the 
proposed amendment must obtain a simple majority to pass (Ciddi, 2011).   
7 Following the 2001 economic crisis, GDP dropped between 5.7 % and 7.5% in 2001; consumer price 
inflation rose to 68.5%; and unemployment in final quarter at 10.4% of work force (ibid., Hale). From 
1999 to 2002, an estimated 6000,000 enterprises went out of business causing 2.3 million people total job 
loses (Hale, 2010; 101). Needless to say, the 2001 economic crisis affected everyone. 
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economy.8 The AKP also sought to ensure greater social justice by reducing unemployment and 
disparities in income distribution. The party’s economic policies balanced the demands of 
entrepreneurial and technocratic middle class alongside the demands of the urban poor (ibid., 
Hale).9 The success of these policies can be seen in Turkey’s economic growth. Currently, the 
Turkish economy is ranked sixteenth in the world, and its annual growth rate is estimated to be 
near 11.4%, which is second only to China and India (Toledano, 2011). In short, the AKP’s 
economic performance has validated the party’s presence and garnered support for the party.  
Finally and perhaps most importantly, the AKP’s conservative ideological position has 
helped sustained the party’s dominance. A survey conducted by Çarkoğlu revealed the 2011 
elections were largely determined by ideological rather than economic points. Given that the 
party oversaw and achieved economic stabilization, ideology became a more prominent issue.  
The AKP’s center-right position was adopted not only as a means of political survival, but also 
to broaden its electoral bases.  
The AKP recognized Welfare’s overt religiosity and anti-system ideology was an 
unsustainable approach because it turned off the technocratic middle class and provoked the 
secular institutions to act. The center-right position of the party was also important because it 
reflected social preferences. According to Çarkoğlu’s findings, utilizing the left-right ideology 
scale was more effective than religiosity in garnering votes. Çarkoğlu attributes this to the “more 
comprehensive” nature of left-right ideologies because it reflects “not only belief and religious 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 The AKP has helped sustain the Turkish economy through manufacturing and exports. Currently, 
Turkey is Europe’s leading bus manufacturer, its third largest commercial-vehicle producer, and the 
world’s seventh largest ship exporter; 4/5ths of all household appliances sold in EU countries are now 
Turkish made; and worldwide turkey’s exports of refrigerators, washing machines, and dishwashers are 
booming. Sales abroad of Turkish textiles and processed foods are also growing (Müftüler-Baç and 
Keyman, 2012; 90). 
9 Among the technocratic middle class include members of MÜSİAD (The Independent Industrialists and 
Businessmen Association). MÜSİAD is an Islamic-oriented business association.  
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practice, but also views on economy, social issues, stances on specific domestic as well as 
international affairs” (Çarkoğlu, 2012; 518). The party’s performance record correlates to 
Çarkoğlu’s findings that claim the conservative Turkish electorate stands more center right than 
to the left of the ideological spectrum. In other words, the social conservatism of the general 
public and the AKP are intimately interlinked. The AKP’s policies related to women is a 
reflection of this.   
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Chapter 4 Waves of Feminism 
This chapter will present the development of the first, second, and third wave of 
feminism in Turkey through a political lens. Following the legacy of Atatürk, women became the 
paradigm for modernization. The reforms under the first wave, otherwise known as “state 
feminism,” worked to nurture a collective state identity, thus women’s rights were framed within 
collective terms rather than individualism. In short, the family symbolized the state and vice 
versa; and women’s rights and duties were centered on her role as a mother and caretaker rather 
than as an independent citizen.  
The emergence of the second wave in the 1980s was a liberal reaction to the 
shortcomings of the first wave, namely the lack of individual rights for women. The second wave 
emerged as a result of the 1980 military coup, which created a vacuum liberal women were 
prepared to fill. Through organized campaigns against domestic and sexual violence, honor 
killings, and rape, the second wave publicized taboo social issues. The second wave also helped 
foster solidarity among women from religious and non-religious backgrounds, as violence in the 
home affected both camps.  
In the 1990s, the emergence of conservatism and Islamist parties aided in the emergence 
of the third wave. Unlike the second wave, which sought to move completely away from the 
legacy of “state feminism,” the third wave adopted the liberal concepts of the second wave and 
applied them within an identity and gender specific framework. This allowed Kurdish, Islamist, 
and LGBT cleavages within the movement to develop. The more recent development of the third 
wave will be further examined in upcoming sections.  
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4.1 The First Wave of Feminism: “State Feminism” and the Republican Woman  
During the fledgling years of the Republic, the reforms on women’s rights were 
considered to be progressive and modern. As previously mentioned, Atatürk’s modernization 
project sought to modernize the state by replicating Western counterparts on both an institutional 
and social level. Reforms aimed toward improving women’s rights included the introduction of 
the 1926 Turkish Civil Code based on the Swiss Civil Code, which replaced the Ottoman Civil 
Code that was based on Sharia. The Turkish Civil Code gave women some positive rights 
including improved divorce laws, an age limit for marriage, equal inheritance rights to men, 
necessary civil marriage for marriage, an end to gender discrimination for valid testimonial, and 
outlawed polygamy (Eslen-Ziya, 2010). Through reforms on women’s rights, the state aimed to 
develop the model, modern woman.  
Kemalism offered legal equality to men and women in an effort to align the new state 
with civilized societies. These reforms resulted in women becoming more active in the public 
sphere by working outside the home and being encouraged to pursue higher education. Nilüfer 
Göle, a professor from the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS), described 
these reforms as “women’s breaking the privacy circle and the collapse of the isolation wall 
between sexes show that the life sphere order by Islam went under the influence of Western 
values” (Özdemir, 2010; 102). These reforms recreated the urban, elite woman into a Republican 
woman who acted as ideological instrument symbolizing both a break with the Ottoman past and 
a paradigm of state modernization.  
The Republican woman also helped foster the development of “state feminism.” The state 
depicted the lives of women during the Ottoman Empire as being oppressed by the Islamic order. 
In contrast, the new, modern Republic represented the emancipation of women from the chains 
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of Islamic patriarchy. In essence, Republican women were conditioned to believe the state-
sanctioned reforms toward improving women’s rights made the state the “main defender of 
women’s rights and equality,” and these women supported the idea that “Turkish women owed 
their rights to Atatürk as well as the Republic” (Korkut, 2010; 316). Armed with “state 
feminism,” Republican woman espoused the ideals of the modernization through her dress, 
actions, education, and overall loyalty to the state. 
Although the intentions behind gender equality reform reflected a desire to encourage the 
empowerment of women, the actual legal rhetoric and overall social mentality continued to 
promulgate the traditional roles of women. This is most evident in the rhetoric used in the 
Turkish Civil Code. According to the code “Man presents family in his capacity of head of the 
family (Article 154);” “Woman’s working is dependent on husband’s approval (Article 155);” 
“Parental right is paternal (Article 160/2);” and “Woman is responsible for nursing of family and 
children (Article 153/2)” (ibid., Özdemir). In addition to this, the rights and duties of women 
outlined in the Civil Code included “[k]eeping the house (Article 153/2)” and “[w]anting the 
husband to look after her and looking after the children and the house (Article 161)” (ibid., 
Özdemir). Instead of working to empower women, the Civil Code continued to perpetuate the 
role and status within a patriarchal framework. 
Other reforms that reflected the contradictory position of the state included the 1924 Law 
on Unification of Education, which allowed girls and boys to be educated together in primary 
school and university. Atatürk asserted a woman’s access to education was imperative for social 
progress because women had the “important mission for bringing up the next generations 
because they are the first to educate children”(ibid., Özdemir). Atatürk saw women strictly in a 
familial context, their sole role being to act as mothers of the state. Atatürk was later quoted as 
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stating, “ ‘the greatest duty of a woman is maternity…. if it is accounted that the first education 
is given in the mother’s bosom, the importance of this duty is understood thoroughly’ ” (ibid., 
Özdemir). 
Although reforms for women’s rights continued to promote traditional roles of women, 
the state still feared women entering public sphere, earning their own incomes and overall 
independence that would jeopardize foundations of family and community. To circumvent too 
much autonomy, the concept of “family means nation; nation means family” made motherhood a 
“patriotic duty” (White, 2003;154). A woman’s citizenry was reflected by her role as a wife and 
a mother.  In this sense, women were seen as part of a collective, family unit and the Civil Code 
reinforced their maternal role both in the home and in society. Similarly, state feminism further 
supported this view of women as a part in a collective of Republican women whose shared duty 
was to nurture the youth of the state.  
Simply put, Republican women armed with state feminism served to act as public 
symbols of modernization and propagate the unity of the state. Though reforms seemingly 
attempted to empower women, strong patriarchal attitudes within society continued to reinforce 
traditional gender roles that promoted the maternal image of women. Professor Deniz Kandiyoti 
described Republican women as being “emancipated, but not liberated” (White, 2003; 158).  
Though no longer trapped within the confines of the home, the social status of the Republican 
woman remained stagnant as women were viewed as part of collective, familial rather than as an 
individual.  
However, state feminism was important because it drew women into the public sphere for 
the first time. Women were exposed to educational and professional opportunities, and were 
integrated into Turkish society. This laid the foundation for successive women’s movements in 
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the 1980s and 1990s. In a similar vein, Atatürk’s view of women also fostered patriarchal 
attitudes, which would continue to influence the social climate and later lay the foundation for 
conservative social policies. In summary, Atatürk viewed the role and duties of a “modern 
Turkish women” to “study, be a teacher, make contributions to the state’s modernization and be 
the ideal wife, look after her husband and children, be the chastity symbol bringing up them” 
(ibid., Özdemir). And this was the image endorsed by the Republic and its reforms on women’s 
rights.  
The rise of a multi-party system in 1950 led to the contestation of Republican idealism 
and secularism. Yet political instability after the closure of the DP led to the implementation of 
the 1961 Constitution. For the women’s movement, the 1961 Constitution enhanced the 
importance of personal rights and freedoms, leading the movement to address class-related issues 
but not the role or status of women. As a result, the women’s movement during the 1960s and 
1970s became extensions of political parties and movements (ibid., Eslen-Ziya). 
Eslen-Ziya and Korkut assert the women’s movement at this time was “reluctant” to 
directly address the role and status of women because it threatened the survival of the movement 
(ibid., Eslen-Ziya). Although Turkey had progressed to a multi-party system and toward 
democratization, women continued to be viewed through a traditional perspective. Forced to 
adhere to the status quo, and to rely on political parties for validation and support, women’s 
organizations could not openly challenge parties as such a radical move would put an end to the 
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4.2 The Second Wave of Feminism: The Rise of Liberal Feminism 
 The second wave of feminism emerged in the 1980s in response to the shortcomings of 
state feminism. According to Ayata and Tütüncü, the second wave emerged as a result of the 
1980 military coup by suppressing the leftist movement it created a niche for women to fill to 
“express their feminist concerns” (Ayata, 2008; 367). Thus, the 1980 military coup inadvertently 
enabled the organization and mobilization of the second wave. Characterized by a younger 
generation of education, middle class professionals, and women of the second wave raised issues 
common to the second wave in the West during the 1960s. The influence of the second wave in 
the West and with the support of the international community, the discourse of the second wave 
publicly addressed taboo social issues. While state leaders and women of the Kemalist era 
supported reforms because they served communal goals (e.g. the unity of the state and family), 
liberal feminists sought recognition for individual rights, including the expression of sexuality 
and protection against sexual harassment or domestic violence. Feminists further argued the 
women’s rights articulated by the Republican elite suppressed autonomous feminists initiative by 
forcing all women to fit within its Republican paradigm. Thus, for feminists a voice was needed 
for liberal values.     
Moving beyond ideological boundaries, the movement galvanized support by taking up 
the issue of violence against women. Discourse included elimination of violence against women, 
of oppression of women within the family, of the use of sexuality as a medium for male 
dominance, of misrepresentation of women in the media and of challenges to virginity tests 
(Diner, 2010). In 1987, a demonstration with 3,000 women in Istanbul catalyzed the liberal 
women’s movement, as it was the first time women were on the streets openly fighting for 
women’s rights. Adopting the Western slogan “the personal is political,” Turkish women framed 
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violence “not as an individual matter in the domestic realm,” but as a relevant, political topic that 
needed to be discussed in the public realm (ibid., Eslen-Ziya).  
 The rise of transnational feminism continued to aid in the support of the second wave. As 
Turkey began to progress in its accession talks with the EU, women’s rights organizations gained 
significant leverage with government authorities. The second wave facilitated several key 
international commitments including the CEDAW (1986); the Vienna Declaration and Program 
of Action (1993); Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women (1993); and the 
Platform for Action of the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing (1995). The EU also 
helped strengthen the hand of women’s rights groups through donor programs and required 
legislative changes as part of the accession process (Coşar, 2003; 331). 
 In summary, the second wave publicly addressed the “illiberal communitarian nature” of 
Ataturk’s conception of modernization by claiming such reforms “bridled respect for women’s 
individuality” (Arat, 2005; 21). The reforms implemented during first wave were characterized 
as communal goals for the state. Republican women supported these reforms as a means of 
paying its dues to the state and by fulfilling their maternal role and responsibilities to the nation. 
In contrast, liberal feminists sought recognition of individual rights, including expression of 
sexuality and protection against sexual harassment or domestic violence. 
 With more radical views and ambitions for restructuring society and by refusing to work 
within the system, the liberal movement successfully established solidarity networks and created 
an autonomous space by breaking out of the republican paradigm. Unlike state feminists, liberal 
feminists claimed autonomy from the state, thus finding more organizational freedom and 
focusing more on women’s issues without being co-opted (ibid., Eslen-Ziya). By publicly 
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addressing a pertinent but taboo subject of violence against women, the second wave effectively 
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4.3 The Emergence of the Third Wave 
The third wave began as a burgeoning movement in the 1990s, and has since gained 
momentum in response to the AKP’s increasingly conservative policies against women. Similar 
to the second wave reaction to state feminism, the third wave emerged as a reaction to the 
shortcomings of mainstream (secular) feminism. Empowered by the ideals embodied in the 
second wave, Kurdish and Islamist feminists spoke out against Turkish mainstream feminists for 
being “ethno-centric and exclusionary of other identities” (Cosar, 2003; 47). The third wave has 
become distinct by emphasizing the heterogeneity of feminism within the feminist movement as 
a whole.  
Alongside secular feminism, the third wave has enabled the emergence and development 
of Kurdish nationalist feminists, Islamist feminists, and more recently, project feminists (Leake, 
2012). The heterogeneous markers of the third wave can be seen in the feminist movement 
today. In concurrence, University of Pennsylvania Ph.D. candidate and feminist activist, Tugce 
Ellialti, described the movement as being representative of the “different kinds of women with 
different kinds of demands and expectations from the movement itself” (Ellialti, 2012). 
According to Ellialti, the nature of the movement was based on diverse ethnicities, sexuality, and 
varying levels of religiosity, which  “[changed] relationships [women have] with feminism itself, 
and their own definitions of what feminism is” (ibid., Ellialti). Thus, the third wave has created a 
space for women who fall outside the norms of feminism to organize and participate alongside 
mainstream feminists.  
 The movement gained momentum following the 1999 Helsinki Summit, in which Turkey 
gained candidacy status. The third wave is characterized by two major developments: 1) 
feminists moved from street protests and small-scale campaigns to organized activism within 
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universities and creating a greater network of support; and 2) the third wave saw the emergence 
of minority identities stemming from the feminist paradigm, including views from Islamist 
women, Kurdish nationalist, and the LGBT community (ibid., Diner).10 
  First, activism within universities and NGOs allowed for greater networking on a 
domestic and international level. Local embassies and consulates of countries with developed 
feminist politics helped Turkish women organize by offering services and some funding for 
feminists to arrange conferences and invite feminist experts from abroad, as well as fund some 
feminist publications to “propagate their ideas” (Arat, 2008; 400). With sufficient funding, 
universities were able to establish women’s studies centers and academic programs, including 
the Istanbul University Women’s Research Center (1990), the Ankara University Women’s 
Studies Center (1993), and the Middle East Technical University Gender and Women’s Studies 
Center (1994) (ibid., Arat, 2008). With sufficient funding, universities gave women greater 
access to feminist research and organizations.  
  Women’s organizations of the third wave also saw the strategic advantage of the EU 
accession process and used it to create a democratic opening for gender rights. Women’s 
organizations used the Copenhagen Criteria to pressure the AKP to eliminate bases for gender 
inequality. This successfully led to the AKP to amend 34 articles of the Constitution. Among 
these accomplishments included amendments to the 1926 Turkish Civil Code.11 In 2005, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  I will describe women within the third wave as “Islamist” because this denotes their role as actors 
within the Islamist political ideology. Though a part of the Islamist movement because these women share 
the same Islamic based values and traditions, these women are claiming their individual personhood by 
contesting the status quo established by the AKP. Çınar distinguishes Islamism as a political ideology, 
and Islamists refers to proponents of this ideology; and Islamic is an adjective to describe “a view, 
thought, style, or practice that makes a reference to Islam as a religion, but not part of Islamist ideology” 
(Çınar, 2005; 15).	  
11	  It should be noted that language of the 2004 amendment to the Civil Code did indeed introduce 
measures for gender equality by asserting “women and men have equal rights,” it did not explicitly state 
women and men are equal. In 2010, the problematic nature of this constitutional syntax gained media 
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movement successfully pressured the government to amend the Penal Code by criminalizing 
marital rape and harshen sentences for those convicted of honor killings (ibid., Eslen-Ziya). The 
EU accession process also allowed the women’s movement in Turkey to expand its international 
network through its alliances with European Women’s Lobby, an umbrella organization that 
brings about four thousand women’s organizations from 25 different European countries (ibid., 
Arat, 2008; 401). Turkey joined in 2004, which helped reinforce its international ties and also 
worked to strengthen the women’s movement at home.  
 More importantly, the third wave provided a space for cleavages within feminism that fell 
outside the liberal and state feminists. Islamists, Kurdish nationalists, and the LGBT movement 
reacted against mainstream feminism, claiming its ethnocentric foundations were exclusionary 
against other identities. As the influence of Islam became more pronounced in Turkish politics, 
the presence of openly religious women (e.g. covered women) in public institutions conflicted 
with the secular principles of the state. Consequently, universities refused to admit covered 
women to lectures and exams. Yet, because most covered women attending universities chose to 
be covered (e.g. were not forced by family members or social norms) and also chose to receive a 
secular education and to participate in public life revealed a convergence between liberal 
feminist thought and Islamist values (ibid., Arat, 2008).   
 This convergence between traditional, Islamic values and liberal feminist thought aided 
in the development of minority identities, including Islamists and Kurdish women. For example, 
conservative Islamist women are ironically similar to Republican women because both 
emphasize the traditional role of women. However, the conservative Islamist basis for this is 
derived from Islam, which legitimizes and upholds the “holy family” and the position of women 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
attention when Prime Minister Erdoğan publicly stated, “men and women are not equal from creation” 
(Aydın, 2010). This statement alludes to the AKP’s attitudes toward women.  	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as fundamental to the family structure (ibid., Eslen-Ziya; 323). In contrast, liberal Islamist 
feminists seek power, but do not fully challenge male authority. Instead these women challenge 
the “secular concept of equality with their insistence on male-female complementary roles and 
their equivalence in Islam” (ibid., Eslen-Ziya). Similar to liberal feminists, these Islamist 
feminists also seek equal status and individualism, but within these complementary roles within a 
family structure. Finally, Kurdish women define themselves in opposition to the state and its 
policies on the Kurds. More specifically, Kurdish women contest the state’s view of them as 
“device to control the Kurdish population” (Arat, 2008; 415). The heterogeneity of the third 
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Chapter 5 Methodology and Findings 
 From the evidence presented above, it has become increasingly clear the political 
environment has heavily influenced the development of the women’s movements throughout the 
years. Given the current political climate, the AKP has emerged as the dominant party and the 
party’s most recent actions related to women’s rights suggest it has shifted the political agenda 
toward pursuing a more socially conservative agenda. In an effort to examine whether the AKP’s 
actions toward women’s rights is or is not indicative of the party’s shift toward a more socially 
conservative agenda, I conducted a quantitative and qualitative analysis of newspapers from 
Hürriyet Daily News that were published during the party’s tenure (2002 to 2012). In addition to 
this, I also conducted interviews with local experts (academics) and women activists in Istanbul.  
The following chapter will present my findings, which revealed the AKP has indeed 
shifted toward pursuing its socially conservative agenda in regards to women. From these 
findings, I analyzed the conditions under which these changes occurred and the impact these 
changes on women. This chapter will conclude with explanations behind the party’s conservative 
shift, specifically examining the motivations behind the shift toward issues related to the physical 
body and labor laws.  
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5.1: Mixed Methods: A Quantitative & Qualitative Analysis of Recurring Issues Related to 
Women  
Through a mixed methods approach, I conducted a quantitative and qualitative analysis 
of newspaper articles that were published during the AKP’s tenure (2002 to 2012). Using a 
random sampling generator, a total of 202 issues from Hürriyet Daily News (HDN) were used in 
my sample. I chose to collect my data from HDN primarily because it was among the few 
Turkish newspaper with an online English-publication with articles from 2002 to 2012. In 
addition to this, HDN is one of the longest standing newspaper publications in Turkey; it has 
survived coups and regime changes, which attests to its objective reporting style. Although the 
AKP has displayed sensitivity against publications perceived as defaming the government, and 
has arrested and prosecuted publications perceived as terrorist threats,12 HDN continues to report 
local and international news in a mostly objective manner. Given that the dates being analyzed 
spanned over a ten-year period, no one source had available information to create a 
comprehensive analysis. To ensure each date had an available issue, I complied my data from 
HDN online website and the Access World News database. For consistency I checked each 
sample date in both resources.  
First, I conducted a quantitative analysis of the articles I collected to measure the direction of 
change in public coverage on issues related to women over the past ten years. Within my sample 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 The 2006 Anti-Terrorism Law (TMY) has stirred controversy for the AKP in recent years. The TMY 
lacks a clear definition of terrorism, and the rubric for the nature of terrorist crimes is vague. For example, 
Article 6 states any person that expresses an idea against the “official state ideology” is vulnerable to 
prosecution for “terrorism” (Gunter, 121). The Ergenekon conspiracy involved an alleged group of 
ultranationalists known as Ergenekon that attempted to overthrow the AKP. Members of the conspiracy 
were arrested and tried. Public reactions to the Ergenekon incident led the AKP to treat “criticisms of its 
policies regarding Ergenekon or the PKK as collusion with those organizations” (Licursi, 2012). Among 
those arrested under TMY are journalists, academics, and politicians. Since 2007, more than 400 potential 
“terrorists” have been arrested or put on trial (Washington Post). The provisions of the TMY are 
contradictory to rule of law, and the TMY is one of the obstacles the AKP must overcome in order to 
move forward to democratization. 
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articles that simply mentioned  “women” were further examined to see first, what issues related 
to women were being reported, and second, the frequency under which these issues were 
reported. From this data I coded and grouped recurring issues into five distinct categories: 
physical body, labor laws, political participation, headscarf, and women’s rights. From my 
findings, my data reflected a definite shift in issues reported within the past ten years. Figure 1 
displays a clear change in content coverage from 2002 to 2012, revealing as issues related to the 
headscarf declined in 2009, issues related to the physical body and labor laws gained greater 
visibility during that same year. Though issues related to the headscarf spiked in 2008, its 
remained low through 2011 and 2012.  
 
Figure 1 displays the recurring issues related to women under the AKP (2002 to 2012). Recurring 
issues included issues related to the headscarf, physical body, political participation, labor laws, and 
women’s rights.  
 
To further understand the relationships among these categories in relation to the AKP’s 
stance on women, I conducted a qualitative analysis. The content of each article within each 
category was re-coded to understand driving forces (such as timing, local and global events, and 
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to determine what stance the AKP had in the matter. My content analysis revealed the shift in 
coverage away from issues related to the headscarf and toward physical body and labor laws 
coincided with the decline of EU soft power and the AKP’s consolidation of power and rise to 
dominance. Thus, this evidence suggests these factors enabled the AKP to shift the political 
agenda away from EU-backed social reforms and toward pursuing the party’s own conservative 
social agenda. 
The AKP’s stagnant reform performance and most recent attempts to ban abortions and curb 
the number of caesarean sections administered simply suggest the party has stumbled more 
toward the right of the political spectrum. However, a more in-depth analysis of the frequency 
and public visibility of these contentious issues related to women, and the conditions under 
which these issues were reported (or stopped being reported), indicates the party has consciously 
revived the debate of social conservatism by returning it to the public domain. 
A secondary component to my mixed-methods approach was interviews I conducted in 
Istanbul, Turkey with local experts (academics) and women activists on the issue of social 
conservatism and the AKP to gain a better understanding of my findings on a localized level. I 
interviewed professors Yeşim Arat from Boğaziçi Universitesi, İştar Gözaydın from Doğuş 
Üniversitesi, Hale Bolak Boratav from Bilgi Universität, University of Pennsylvania Ph.D 
candidate and feminist activist, Tuğçe Ellialtı, and two feminist activists from Amgari Women’s 
Organization. From these interviews I was able to gain insight into how these women living in 
Turkey interpret social values and conservative policies. Given the 2012 controversy over the 
attempt to ban abortion and Caesarean regulations, there is limited published work on the recent 
developments as it relates to the AKP and social conservatism. These interviews revolving 
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around these issues provided valuable interpretations of how women in society perceived and 
reacted to these events.    
This chapter will first present my qualitative and quantitative findings on recurring 
contentious issues related to women through the categories of physical body, labor laws, 
political participation, headscarf, and women’s rights. Second, this chapter will draw 
conclusions regarding the level of visibility of each sub-category within these main categories. 
Finally, this chapter will explore the relationship between physical body and labor laws to 
headscarf and its significance for the AKP and women in society.  
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5.2 Political Participation  
 
Figure 2 shows the number of articles related to issues of political participation.  
 
The sub-categories for political participation include state-led initiatives; challenges to 
the system; and other, which consists of articles that simply mention words related to political 
participation, but are not necessarily relevant to this analysis.13 Though women in Turkey were 
granted the right to vote in 1934, political representation and access to decision making have 
remained consistently low. Of the articles related to political participation, all articles between 
2004 and 2006 mentioned issues related to challenging the system or initiatives improving 
representation of women (see figure 4). Considering 2007 was an election year, the AKP focused 
its platform around garnering the woman vote.  
Addressing the low number of women MPs and overall representation of women in 
decision-making processes, the AKP publicly announced its support to be more inclusive of 
women. Following the 2007 elections, the AKP announced it would launch several programs 
aimed toward increasing the number of female mayors (“AKP to increase female leaders,” 
2007). Yet after the 2009 elections, only 27 women mayors were elected. Considering the total 
number of mayors in Turkey is 2,948, women mayors only accounted for 0.9% (Müftüler-Baç, 
2012; 12). In 2007, there was a dip in media coverage on all sub-categories related to political 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Although words such as “voting” and “representation” appeared in this sample, the context of these 
words was oftentimes not relevant to this analysis (e.g. “voting” for best Turkish designers). Thus, the 
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participation, and from 2008 to 2009 there were no articles found discussing these issues. This 
lull can be attributed to the party shifting its focuses to more pressing issues, specifically the 
headscarf controversy, which was heating up at this time.  
However, beginning in 2010 political participation regained visibility, specifically in the 
sub-category of “challenging the system.” Although women’s organizations in 2004 and 2010 
made crucial efforts to persuade the government to amend Article 10 of the Constitution to 
include affirmative action for women’s access to political decision making, in 2010 claims by 
opposition parties (mainly the CHP) that the AKP was not doing enough to include women in the 
political process drew the most media attention (ibid., Müftüler-Baç). Again, given that 2011 
was another important election year, the CHP publicly challenged the party for hindering the 
political participation of women, claiming the CHP would grant “higher political representation 
to women and children” (“Who’s who in the new party assembly of Turkey’s main opposition.”). 
A similar headline published the same day stated the CHP would help reshape party policies with 
its 46 new members, 21 of which were women (“Turkey’s main opposition chief makes 41 
promises for the party,” 2010). Considering the 2010 timing, the CHP was clearly attempting to 
draw attention to the shortcomings of the AKP’s 2007 promises to be more inclusive of women 
on a political level.  
Though the AKP once again was victorious in the 2011 elections, the party’s attempts to 
garner the women vote based on promises of increased political inclusion went unfulfilled. In the 
2007 national elections, only 50 women were elected to Parliament of 550 seats; and in 2011, 
only 78 women MPs were elected (ibid., Müftüler-Bac). Despite this increase, women account 
for only 14% MPs. In a 2011 article, AKP deputy Fatma Şahin acknowledged the need to 
increase women’s involvement in the decision-making process, claiming “women can more 
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efficiently pursue their rights and have a voice on policies regarding family, society, and national 
affairs” (Şahin, 2012; 44). Currently she is the one and only women minister; she is the head of 
Minister of Family and Social Policies. Hale Bolak characterized Şahin as a  “strong woman” 
with “good advisors trying to do good things” (Bolak, 2012). Although working within the 
constraints of a “more conservative agenda” Bolak emphasized Sahin is “more sympathetic to 
the demands of women’s groups,” reflecting that the “party is [not] a homogeneous whole” 
(ibid., Bolak). However, Bolak stated that regardless of Sahin’s sympathy or support the 
“ultimate decision making power rests somewhere else, usually not just where the women are” 
(ibid., Bolak). 
Though political participation is a recurring issue throughout this sample, articles 
mentioning political participation have remained the lowest (see figure 1). However, the 
recurrence of this issue is especially important in regards to timing because it reflects shifting 
efforts by the AKP and opposition parties to gain support from women voters during the years 
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5.3 Women’s Rights 
 
Figure 3 shows the number of articles related to women’s rights.  
 
The sub-categories for women’s rights include articles that explicitly mention “equality” 
and “inequality;” “women’s rights;” and issues related to women’s status, which includes articles 
that used language to present the issue of women’s status (e.g. “positive discrimination,” 
“stereotypes,” “affirmative action,” “women’s empowerment,” etc.…). In 2002, the AKP was 
inaugurated into office with an active commitment to the EU accession process. Using the 
Copenhagen Criteria, women’s organizations called on the state to improve equality and to end 
inequality between men and women. This is reflected in the 2002 spike in articles related to 
“equality” and “inequality.”  
This year was also a pivotal year for the AKP and human rights reform as it allowed the 
party to further legitimize itself and Turkey both abroad and at home. One article described the 
EU accession process as “an affirmation that a predominately Muslim country with a secular 
democratic regime can blend in with other democracies…[and] women were given equal rights 
with men [since] the Republic was, above all, to become a ‘European society’” (“Turkey’s 
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this approach yielded positive results during this high reform period as articles calling for greater 
equality and/or ending inequality remained relatively low.  
However, the same cannot be said of the low number of reports related to “equality” and 
“inequality” from 2005 to 2008. The shifting relationship between the EU and the AKP led to a 
decline in reforms and overall low reform period. Despite this decline in EU-drive reforms, 
women continued to fight for equality by openly contesting issues related to women’s status. 
While the sub-category of women’s rights remained relatively high during this period and into 
2009, the explicit usage of the phrase “women’s rights” began to decline. This move suggests 
women began to move away from general language, and began to use language more specific to 
women’s status. From 2005 to 2008, more articles began questioning the “limitations of 
discrimination against women” (“Turkish Press Yesterday,” 2005) and the “position of women in 
society” (“Turkish culture month in Helsinki,” 2008); drawing attention to women being treated 
as “second class citizens” (“Has the AKP unveiled its 'real face?” 2008); and calling for the state 
to “strengthen the role of women in society” ("Diplomacy Newsline," 2006) and to “break 
stereotypes” (“Turkish origin Danish Parliamentarian empower ethnic minorities,” 2009).  
Articles mentioning issues related to the status of women from 2003 to 2012 remained 
consistently high, indicating the status of women is a not a new issue. Another motivating factor 
behind the rise in the sub-category of “women’s rights” and switch toward more direct language 
is oftentimes human rights and women’s rights become conflated with one another. This 
inadvertently leads the public to lose sight of rights specific to women, such as reproductive and 
bodily rights. Thus, the shift toward language directly related to women’s status was done to 
ensure the rights of women were not lost in the sea of human rights reform.  
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Though the EU-driven reform period began to slow down in 2005, AKP deputies 
continued to frame women’s rights as a necessary requirement the success of state. President Gül 
was quoted as stating, “peace and development in societies are possibly only when women enjoy 
equal rights” (“Diplomacy Newsline," 2006). However, the disconnect between legislation and 
actual implementation became increasingly clear as women continued to openly protest against 
the state on this matter. When asked why the state chooses to draw up legislation but does not 
enforce it, Yeşim Arat stated, “I think for any political party that [passing legislation] is 
something that easily [gives] an impression or send a signal that they are progressive, [that] they 
[the state] are for human – women’s rights and if they don’t have to implement it then they don’t 
have to lose anything” (Arat, 2012). Arat’s observations reflect a trending disconnect between 
legislation and implementation in AKP policy. This will be a recurring trend throughout 
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5.4 An Overview of the Headscarf in Turkey  
With the establishment of the Republic in 1923, women came to embody progressive 
reforms geared toward modernization. In an effort to breakaway from its Islamic past, Atatürk’s 
modernization project controlled the public presence of religion and religious symbols, namely 
wearing of the fez for men and the headscarf for women. In the beginning of the Republic no 
official ban was implemented; however, districts were allowed to determine whether a woman 
could wear a headscarf in public (Çınar, 2005). The state remained committed to modernization 
even after the transition to a multi-party system in 1950. As more women were seen working in 
public, fewer women were seen wearing headscarves, which reflected the influential push from 
above to retain control over religion in the public sphere.  
It was not until the period following the Iranian Revolution that the headscarf became a 
politically salient issue. The transnational Islamic movement abetted in the development and 
proliferation of political Islam throughout the Middle East and North Africa regions. Coinciding 
with this time, high numbers of internal and external migration from villages to urban centers 
further enabled the emergence of political Islam in Turkey. The transnational Islamic movement 
coupled with the influx of the traditional, rural “periphery” into the urban “center” brought a 
resurgence of religion into the public sphere. Among the rural migrants, women dressed in 
traditional, modest Anatolian attire, including the headscarf, made their style of dress a “visible 
symbol of adherence” to the Islamic movement (Elver, 2012; 18). Women came to embody the 
rising conflict between Islamists and secularists, the site of contention centered on the headscarf.  
During the late 1980s legislation passed in parliament reflected increasing conservative 
sentiments in the state. In 1989, parliament passed a law allowing women to wear headscarves in 
universities, citing that “dress is not subject to any prohibition in higher education, provided that 
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is not forbidden by law” (ibid., Elver). Though a mild victory for Islamists and religious groups, 
the religious fervor promulgated by radical right parties (such as Welfare) and the headscarf 
controversy brought on by Virtue prompted secular institutions of the state to act.14 Under the 
direction of the military elite and university president February 28, 1997 Process lead the Higher 
Education Council (YÖK) to issue an official banning of the headscarves in universities.  
The following section will present the development and decline of the headscarf 
controversy under the AKP. First, this section will introduce the development of the headscarf 
controversy from 2002 to 2008. During this period the headscarf became increasingly 
contentious as EU incentives remained high, leaving the AKP to walk a fine line between 
appeasing its religious constituency and staying true to its EU commitments. Second, this section 
will present the headscarf controversy from 2008 to 2012 and the overall decline of the 
controversy during this period. Specifically, this section will analyze the influential events 
surrounding the shift in content coverage away from the headscarf and toward issues related to 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 In 1999, Virtue deputy Merve Kavakçı stirred controversy during a post-election ceremony where she 
refused to remove her headscarf. Kavakçı made it clear during the Virtue campaign that “she would not 
remove her headscarf in the National Assembly in accordance with law” (Mecham, 2004; 348). Virtue 
leaders allowed Kavakçı to attend the ceremony, but when she entered the National Assembly with her 
headscarf chaos ensued as deputies of the Assembly banging on desks, shouting, “‘Get out!’” (ibid., 
Mecham). After an hour, Kavakçı was unable to take her seat and left. Soon after Virtue was closed on 
the grounds of anti-secular activity. This incident shows the contentious nature of the headscarf preceding 
the AKP, and reflects the intense sensitivity around the issue during this time.  
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5.5 The Headscarf Controversy from 2002 to 2008 
From 2002 to 2012, articles mentioning or related to the headscarf remained consistently 
high. Though from 2002 to 2008 issues related to physical body, labor laws, political 
participation, and women’s rights began to surface, the headscarf remained a dominant issue 
throughout this period. Although the AKP was explicitly against the headscarf ban in 
universities, the support of the ban by the Constitutional Court, the European Human Rights 
Commission, and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) forced the party to downplay 
the issue in its first term (Arat, 2010; 872). During this time, the political agenda was heavily 
influenced by secular constraints, specifically threat of closure by the Constitutional court, and 
high public ambitions for EU accession. However, tensions over the headscarf ban continued to 
be on the rise as the division between religious and non-religious sects continued to polarize 
society.  
The controversy gained international publicity in 2004 with the Leyla Şahin v. Turkey 
case. Şahin, who at the time was a fifth year medical student at the Faculty of Medicine of the 
University of Istanbul, challenged the headscarf ban when she was prohibited from attending 
lectures and denied access to an examination because she refused to remove her headscarf. 
University officials justified their actions as upholding the banning of headscarves from public 
state institutions. Despite the pressure of institutional constraints working against the party’s 
conservative leanings, the AKP openly gave its support to the Şahin case. However, in the end 
the ECHR decision stated the headscarf ban was indeed in line with Article 9 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, claiming there had been “no violation of Şahin’s freedom of 
religion” (Elver, 2012; 76).15 Though Şahin appealed her case to the Grand Chamber of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights states “1. Everyone has the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion…[and] 2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject 
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ECHR, the outcome remained the same on the grounds that “Turkey’s political concerns about 
maintaining secularism legitimated interfering with [Şahin’s] freedom of religion” (ibid., Elver). 
The Leyla Şahin v. Turkey decision served as a turning point for the headscarf 
controversy for several reasons. First, the AKP’s open support of Şahin against the state raised 
concerns among secularists over the party’s commitment to the secular nature of the state. For 
some secularists, the AKP’s support of Şahin was perceived as the party threatening to revert 
Turkey to a fully Islamic state. More importantly, the reactions to the Şahin decision emphasized 
the importance of preserving collective state secularity over the individual freedom of citizens, 
specifically prioritizing social order over the individual rights of women. The preservation of 
social order remained a recurring theme throughout the headscarf controversy as well as issues 
related to the physical body and labor laws, which will be discussed more in-depth in later 
sections.  Finally, the Şahin decision further complicated the controversy by raising the question 
of public and private spaces. By 2006 this lack of distinction began to have a more direct impact 
on covered women in society.  
In 2006, party deputies became more vocal as secular sensitivities surrounding the 
headscarf ban began to affect covered women in public state institutions. The unclear boundaries 
between private and public spaces left covered women vulnerable to legal prosecution. When the 
Council of State dictated schoolteachers could not wear their headscarves on their way to and 
from the school, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated “Soon they (the Council of State) 
will be getting involved with what we do in our homes,” openly suggesting the secular sect of the 
state was infringing upon the personal rights of women (“Press scanner,” 2006). Then House 
Speaker of Parliament, Bülent Arınç, took it a step further and implied the ban on wearing a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests 
of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others” (Murdoch, 2007; 4).  
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headscarf in public was not “compatible with civil liberties” (“Gunduz Aktan: Once again 
secularism (2)," 2006). The AKP validated its stance through Anglo-Saxon secular rhetoric, 
justifying civil liberties and a woman’s right to choose to be covered.  This effectively moved the 
headscarf issue within the parameters of personal freedoms, and put the secularist claims for 
human rights into question. Secularists perceived the AKP as being hypocritical on the issue, 
claiming any relaxation of the headscarf ban threatened the secular foundation of the state. 
Although the religious motivations of the AKP were not a secret, the secular framing of issue 
heightened the controversy, once again putting the personal freedoms and individual rights of 
women into question. The dimensions of the headscarf debate further polarized the AKP and its 
religious consistency from the secularists.  
During the latter half of 2006, secularist fears escalated as the covered wives of AKP 
deputies deepened the controversy. In October, then President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, a staunch 
secularist, refused to allow politicians whose wives wore headscarves to attend a ball celebrating 
Turkish independence, stating it would “compromise” and undermine the secular state founded 
by Atatürk (“Turkey in veil controversy”). Among the women in question included Emine 
Erdoğan, wife to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. In the past, covered deputies created 
controversy such as the case with the Virtue incident that sealed the party’s closure. The 
presence of covered women within the state made secularists uneasy.  
The “problem” of covered wives in government reappeared in early November as talks of 
then Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül’s candidacy for president began to surface. However, media 
attention was drawn to Hayrünnisa Gül and her headscarf, not Gül himself. The military publicly 
commented the Turkish state could not be represented by a leader whose “first lady has a 
headscarf” (ibid., Elver; 23). For secularists, the possibility of the headscarf becoming a part of a 
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state institution became a realized fear. In April, the Office of the Chief of General Staff issued 
an “e-memorandum” on the website of the General Staff reminding the public of the army’s duty 
and responsibility to protect the fundamental principles of the Republic (Turkish Armed Forces).  
Though Emine Erdoğan, Hayrünnisa Gül, and covered women working in the public 
sector were not elected government officials or representatives, their presence alone as covered 
women was enough to distress the secular elite. As the controversy heated up, divisions between 
Islamists and secularists deepened. In May, the controversy turned violent when Judge Mustafa 
Yucel Ozbilgin, who voted against lifting the headscarf ban, was shot dead by a zealous Islamist. 
Before shooting the judge, the attacker yelled, “I am the soldier of God;” he later claimed he 
attacked the court as protest against the court’s decision on headscarves (“Arslan faces life for 
council of state shooting,” 2006). This incident reflected the height of contention of the headscarf 
controversy in both the political and social spheres.   
From 2007 to 2010 divisions within society worsened. The re-election of the AKP in 
2007 gave the party the necessary two-thirds majority in parliament to submit a constitutional 
referendum and to begin its endeavor to democratize Turkey by first lifting the headscarf ban. 
Following the principles of the ECHR, the AKP declared it would create a new “civilian 
constitution” to help democratize the state (Elver, 2012; 26).  Employing democratic rhetoric, the 
AKP framed the headscarf ban within terms of civil liberties, further validating its cause in the 
eyes of the international community. Despite the waning support of the AKP for EU accession, 
the party was still required to maintain face. Thus, it was necessary for the party to frame the 
headscarf controversy within democratic terms to avoid accusations of Islamizing the state and 
delegitimized the party all together. Additionally, the ECHR is not a direct extension of the EU 
and the AKP was not reprimanded for moving against the Şahin v. Turkey decision.  
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Despite the AKP’s efforts, secularists saw the 2007 constitutional referendum as an 
attempt by the party to “Islamize” the state with its “hidden agenda” by removing the ban on 
headscarves in universities (Bayramoglu, 2007). Secularists specifically criticized Article 45 of 
the referendum, which stated, “no one shall be deprived of the right to higher education because 
of his or her dress” (Elver, 2012; 5). From one side, the secularists argued the AKP was violating 
the Şahin v. Turkey decision, in which the headscarf ban was found compatible with the 
Convention. In its defense, the AKP argued against allegations of a “hidden agenda” and 
justified the lifting of the ban as a part of the democratization process. In response, secular 
authorities strictly began to enforce the headscarf ban in universities. In one instance, a teacher 
was fired for wearing a headscarf to school under the justification that “as a teacher, she is a role 
model for her students; therefore it is not acceptable to wear a headscarf, even in her private life” 
(Elver, 2012; 34).  
By initiating the 2007 constitutional referendum, the AKP received major backlash not 
only for its attempts to lift the headscarf ban but also for its aims to increase parliamentary 
control over the military and judiciary. Since the conception of the Republic, both bodies have 
acted with semi-autonomy, and institutional constraints against the executive and parliamentary 
branches. The 1960 military coup d’état set a precedential role for the military and Constitutional 
Court as “ ‘guardian[s]’ of state power,” and protecting the secular state from religious 
incursions (ibid., Bayramoglu). However, the overbearing roles of both bodies did not align with 
democratization requirements necessary for EU accession. Thus, the status of the 2007 
constitutional referendum remained a thorn at the side of secularists. These tensions between 
secularists and the AKP over the headscarf controversy provoked secular elites to act, which laid 
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the foundation for the 2008 spike in headscarf coverage and the closure case against the AKP in 
2008.  
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5.6 The Headscarf Controversy 2008-2012  
Articles reporting the headscarf controversy in 2008 increased to 28% from 18% in 2007 
(see figure 1).  During this time secularists attempted to close the AKP on the grounds of 
promoting an anti-secular agenda after the party’s attempt to lift the headscarf ban through the 
2007 constitutional referendum. In addition to this, the AKP’s 2007 campaign promised to lift 
the ban. As secularists pressured universities to enforce the ban, AKP deputies continued to push 
legislation to lift the ban. With the support of the conservative Nationalist Movement Party 
(MHP) as signatories of the headscarf protocol, the AKP gained the parliamentary support 
necessary to push amendments to lift the ban. In February 2008, parliament approved 
amendments that later paved the way for women to be allowed to wear headscarves in 
universities (Elver, 2012; 35).   
Although this was a victorious moment for the AKP and its religious constituency, the 
amendments to lift the ban provoked a strong reaction from the secular side. Thousands of 
demonstrators supporting the ban protested in the streets against the amendments. In addition to 
this, the CHP asked the Constitutional Court to block the new law as its implementation signaled 
a move toward becoming an Islamic state. Other parties also called on the AKP to not follow 
through with the constitutional package lifting the ban. The Democratic Left Party (DSP) called 
on President Gül not to approve the amendments lifting the ban “to diffuse prevailing tensions in 
the country” (“DSP calls on president not to approve headscarf package," 2008). As political 
tensions spilled over into the social sphere, secularists seized their opportunity. By March 2008 
the Chief Public Prosecutor of the Court of Cassation brought an official case against the AKP 
seeking to ban the party and 70 of its members, including Prime Minister Erdoğan and President 
Gül, on charges of violating the secular principles of the constitution.  
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In July 2008 the Constitutional Court rejected the prosecutor’s case, but imposed a heavy 
fine on the party for undermining the constitution. The Court also ruled against the constitutional 
amendment package, and subsequently annulled the proposed amendments to lift the ban on the 
grounds that removing the ban went against the founding secular principles. Though narrowly 
escaping closure, the Constitutional Court’s verdict served as a serious warning to the AKP and 
forced the party to rethink its political agenda. Chairman of the Turkey-EU delegation at the 
European parliament, Joost Lagendijk, was quoted as being “relieved by the ruling” but also 
expressed concern over the AKP’s next steps stating, “[the party] has to show more sensitivity to 
the fears and worries of that part of the Turkish population that did not vote for them” (ibid., 
Boland). 
The initial approval of the 2007 constitutional referendum was a short-lived victory for 
the AKP that later sparked serious backlash from secular members of society and almost led to 
the official closure of the party. Considering the consequences, the AKP backed off pursuing its 
plans to lift the ban. In 2009 articles reporting issues related to the headscarf fell from 28% in 
2008 to 3% (figure 1). During this period issues related to the physical body, labor laws, and 
women’s rights became more visible. Though the headscarf re-emerged in 2010, the 2009 shift 
toward other issues relevant to women’s individual rights and freedoms indicates the party 
employed a pragmatic approach to avoid further controversy. Although the 2007 constitutional 
referendum nearly led to the demise of the AKP, the referendum came to a public vote in 2010 
and revived the headscarf debate once more, and eventually led to an informal lifting of the ban. 
The head YÖK, Yusuf Ziya Özcan, publicly announced students wearing headscarves are no 
longer subject to being removed from class for being “in violation of discipline regulations” 
(“YÖK head gives personal guarantee to all Turkish students on headscarves,” 2010).  
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The lifting of the headscarf ban, though informal, was a pivotal moment for the AKP for 
several reasons. First, it showcased the party’s ability to overcome institutional constraints with 
the use of secular rhetoric. Whereas Welfare and Virtue utilized overt religious tones, the AKP 
was able to frame and execute its conservative agenda within the boundaries set by the secular 
elite. Second, the lifting of ban proved the AKP’s commitment to democratization, and also 
symbolized a victory for the party and its conservative constituency. Finally, the success of the 
headscarf ban asserted the AKP’s dominant political position, which paved the way for the party 
to pursue its conservative agenda on a social level. By 2011, articles mentioning issues related to 
the headscarf declined again and remained low in 2012. This evidence suggests the headscarf 
issue has normalized in society and the AKP has turned its efforts toward issues related to the 











	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  Normalized in this context refers to how the headscarf has become a less contentious, political issue 
and a more socially accepted form of personal expression. Hale Bolak used the term “normalized” to 
describe the increased presence of covered women in a university setting and the increased interaction 
between covered and non-covered women in social settings. 	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5.7 Physical Body: Violence Against Women and Government Initiatives  
In 2012, issues related to physical body and labor laws were the two highest mentioned 
issues. The increased visibility of these issues suggests the AKP is indeed addressing physical 
body and labor laws related to women, though it is often times not in line with the interests of 
women. In other words, the socially conservative stance of the AKP in regards to issues related 
to the physical body and labor laws are limiting the ability for women to find opportunities 
outside the realm of the home. Left with few viable options, women are pressured to return 
and/or remain home, and to take on traditional roles as mothers and caretakers. 
 
Figure 4 shows articles mentioning issues related to the physical body.  
 
Issues related to physical body were broken down into three sub-categories: acts of 
violence against women and/or domestic violence; initiatives by government to prevent violence 
against women; and motherhood and the reproductive regulation of women. From 2002 to 2004, 
a vigorous campaign initiated and organized by the Women for Women’s Human Rights 
(WWHR) under the umbrella platform The Platform for the Reform of the Turkish Penal Code 
fought for constitutional gender equality between men and women. Given that from 2002 to 
2004 the AKP still had a precarious relationship with secular state institutions and its EU 
candidacy was still fresh, the platform was successful in pressuring the party to implement the 
proposed amendments on September 26, 2004. The amendments to the Penal Code included 
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suspension for those who committed honor killings and for rapists and abductors who married 
their victims; and abolishing discrimination between virgins and non-virgins, married and 
unmarried women in sexual crimes (Kandiyoti, 2011). According to the new code, sexual crimes 
were re-defined as ‘crimes against individuals,’ instead of ‘crimes against humanity’ (Arat, 2008; 
408).  
In this moment, it appeared the AKP was in full support of prioritizing the individual 
rights of women. Despite this seemingly progressive move by the AKP, in 2004 the party 
proposed to re-criminalize adultery.  Though articles reported the party entered a “gentlemen’s 
agreement” with the CHP promising not to take unilateral action and that “all amendment 
proposals in the original draft [of the Turkish Civil Code] would be co-sponsored by the two 
parties” (“Confidence crisis between Erdogan and EU,” 2004). However, in a last minute effort 
in 2005, the AKP attempted to push for the adultery law once more. Though in the end the 
original amendment package was passed without the adultery clause, this incident reflected the 
socially conservative inklings within the party. Yet, the institutional and international constraints 
forced the AKP to refrain from pursuing similar “reforms” during this period.  
According to figure 4, articles mentioning acts of violence (including domestic violence 
and honor killings) against women remained consistently high while articles mentioning 
government initiatives did not emerge until 2009. During 2009, increasing pressure from local 
women’s organizations and public reactions from women in society attracted media attention. 
Often times women’s organizations would prompt the government to act by using the media to 
voice discontent. More importantly, the 2009 Opuz v. Turkey decision in which the ECHR found 
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Turkey in violation of its obligations to protect women forced the AKP to act on its international 
commitments.17    
Violence against women in Turkey continues to remain a major problem. Though the 
Law 4320 on the Protection of the Family was intended to provide protection from violence, the 
shortcomings of the law have had a severe impact on women at risk. In 2008, a national survey 
reported 39% of women were exposed to violence by husband or boyfriend in their lifetime; the 
rate for women who were divorced or separated increased to 73% (Çarkoğlu, et al., 2012; 49).  
The content of the articles I sampled repeatedly attributed such violence to the inadequate 
implementation of the Law 4320 and the Penal Code. One article published in June 2009 stated, 
“Despite [these] improvements in [legislation], administrative and judicial bodies are far from 
capable of protecting women” (“Brother also arrested for attack on girl in Sirrt,” 2009).  
The root causes of poor implementation can be traced to a strong patriarchal mentality 
that permeates throughout society and consequently affects the effectiveness of the legal process. 
As a result, women are often pressured by local officials and sometimes family members to not 
press charges, and that is if they choose to report at all.  One report on the Law 4320 found 
women were encouraged to “forgive their husbands rather than seek legal protection ‘in order to 
protect their children and their home’” (Rodriguez, 20090; 36). In other instances women 
who’ve chose to report abuse are often “turned away and advised, or pressured, by police to 
reconcile with their abusive spouses,” which has created mistrust in the police and overall 
effectiveness of the law (ibid., Rodriguez). Ellialti discussed how women collectives work to 
show cases of women killings and sexual assaults are not moments of “exception, and are not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Opuz v. Turkey is a landmark case where the ECHR found Turkey in violation of its obligations “to 
protect women from domestic violence, and for the firs time held that gender-based violence is a 
discrimination under the European Convention.” The case involved the brutal abuse of Nahide Opuz and 
her mother by Opuz’s husband. Although both parties sought protection from local authorities, adequate 
protection was not provided, and Opuz’s husband murdered Opuz’s mother. (“Opuz v. Turkey,” 2011).  
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exceptional” (Ellialti, 2012). Rather, Ellialti described violence against women is persistent 
throughout society: 
“I can say this patriarchal attitudes are so engrained in the minds of legal 
professionals including judges, prosecutors, even lawyers I think that of course 
including the police officers because most of the time the police is the primary 
station for women to go for other victims of violence to go.  So, again because 
you can change the law but you cannot change the minds and mentalities of 
people over night. it’s a huge process, [and] it’s directly related to how you define 
womanhood, manhood, what you think about gender, [and] about our lives” 
(Ellialti, 2012). 
 
Though the AKP has taken the initiative to address violence against women on a legal 
level, the lack of implementation motivated by patriarchal norms has rendered legal reform 
ineffective. The 2011 Human Rights Watch Report titled He Loves You, He Beats You observed 
such tendencies, citing law officials often “prioritize preserving [the] family unit” and “push 
battered women to reconcile with abuses” (Human Rights Watch, 2011;50). The preservation of 
the family over the individual rights of women undermines the 2004 Penal Code amendments, 
which explicitly classified crimes against women as ‘crimes against the individual’ rather than 
against the family or social order (Müftüler-Baç, Meltem, 2012; 9). Despite seemingly strong 
legislation committed to protecting the individual rights of women, the party’s pursuits toward a 
more socially conservative agenda continues to encourage a patriarchal mentality at the expense 
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5.8 Physical Body: Motherhood and the Reproductive Regulation of Women 
The steady increase of issues related to motherhood and the reproductive regulation of 
women from 2006 to 2012 and its peak in 2011 indicates a shift in the AKP’s agenda in regards 
to the status of women. This recent rise in visibility is due to increasing demographic changes in 
Turkey. Since the 1990s the annual population growth has been declining due to decreasing 
fertility rates; as of 2009, the annual population growth was estimated to be 1.4% (Çarkoğlu, 
Asli, et al., 2012; 50). Though by European standards this rate is considered relatively high, this 
number is lowest rate seen in Turkish history (ibid., Çarkoğlu, Asli, et al.). The 2010 UNICEF 
Turkey Reports state this decrease in fertility rates is beneficial for the country’s development. A 
critical review on explicit family policies in Turkey by Asli CarkoGület al. supported this view 
claiming: 
“If [Turkey] can manage to implement successful education and 
employment policies at this time, by increasing the effort on early 
childhood education, for which the country never had enough resources 
before but now with the declining fertility rate should be able to invest 
more in, [Turkey] can create a new generation of young adults in much 
greater numbers, with much better prospects to be productive and 
competitive in the mid-twenty first century globalized world” (ibid., 
Çarkoğlu, Asli, et al.). 
 
Yet, despite UNICEF’s optimistic view on Turkey’s declining fertility rate, Prime 
Minister Erdoğan continues to urge families (namely women) to have at least three children to 
encourage economic growth and to “combat [the] aging population ‘crisis’” (Çarkoğlu, Asli, et 
al., 2012; 45). The prime minister’s words resonated with some members of society, including 
one Turkish property developer who began offering three-bedroom apartments with a 33% 
discount for married couples with three children (“3 babies get a 33% discount,” 2011). 
However, others have read Erdoğan’s “population concerns” as a euphemism for women to 
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return to their true calling as mothers and caregivers. This view is further supported by the 
AKP’s most recent attempts to impose reproductive regulations on women.  
Beginning in 2008 articles related to the sub-category of motherhood and reproductive 
regulations started mentioning Cesarean sections, often times expressing government concern 
over its increasing rates. One such article published in 2008 announced the Ministry of Health’s 
goal to reduce the percentage of Cesarean sections from 42% to 25% (“Scanner sabah," 2008). In 
2011, a similar article was published stating the Ministry of Health would begin a campaign to 
reduce the number of Cesarean operations “due to the growing number of women opting for such 
births” (“Turkish health officials look to reduce number of Caesareans,” 2011). By July 2012 
Parliament passed an amendment that allowed Cesarean sections only “in case of medical 
emergencies” (“Turkey moves to reduce cesarean surgeries,” 2012). Erdoğan’s was later quoted 
as saying Caesarian sections “were nothing but an ‘operation’ to limit population growth because 
women who opted for the procedure could not have more than two children” (“Turkish PM says 
preparing anti-abortion bill,” 2012). Typically, it is more difficult for women to give birth 
naturally after a Cesarean section is performed, which consequently limits the number of births a 
woman is able to have. In short, this relatively new regulation on Cesarean sections has made 
elective operations punishable by law and limited a woman’s right to choose her preferred 
method of birth. The motivations behind the Cesarean sections regulation further encouraged 
Erdoğan’s calls women to have at least three children.  
The topic of abortion has also gained increased visibility in recent months. In May 2012, 
Erdoğan publicly compared abortion to “murder,” and soon after the AKP attempted to introduce 
legislation that would only allow abortions to be performed during the first six weeks of 
pregnancy, thus reducing the current 10 week limit (“Abortion ban latest issue to polarize 
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Turkey,” 2012). Given that most women do not realize they are pregnant until the sixth week, 
this legislation would have resulted in a de facto ban on abortion. Though this legislation was 
abandoned shortly after public protests, a “practical ban” has since taken place. In an interview 
with Ozlen and Hilal, local feminists from the Amargi Organization in Istanbul, both described 
incidences where public hospitals refused to administer an abortion despite there being no 
official ban.18 Hilal explained because of this “practical ban” doctors are unwilling to perform 
abortions for fear of punishment by the state: “[There] is a kind of fear[,] some kind of 
psychological pressure on doctors by the government…so [doctors] really should dare to make 
abortion [under] these conditions” (Ozlen and Hilal, 2012). Hilal suggests that for a doctor to 
perform an abortion despite government disapproval would be perceived as a challenge to state 
authority and would lead to serious consequences. Though abortion is still legal in Turkey, the 
threat of government repercussion dissuades doctors from administering the abortion procedure.  
Similarly, Ozlen described incidences where a woman trying to obtain an abortion would 
first have to go through a series of hurdles: “For example, the woman will have to listen to the 
heartbeats of the fetus…[but] you first meet with psychologists, consultants, [which is going to 
be an] obligation with this new regulation. You have to explain, you have to convince the 
psychologist you need it (laughs)” (ibid., Ozlen and Hilal). Despite the sensitive nature of 
abortion, Ozlen’s attitude reflects a sense of disbelief that the state would impose such 
stipulations over a procedure that directly impacts the woman, not the state. Since the legislation 
to ban abortion was abandoned, talks of regulations on abortion (similar to the regulation on 
Cesarean sections) begun circulating. The reluctance of public hospital doctors to perform 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Amargi is a women’s organization in Istanbul, Turkey “fighting against all exploitation 
systems, militarism, racism, heterosexism,” and the organization aims to “spread feminism [as 
an] alternative against [these systems]” (Amargi).  
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abortions and rumors of abortion regulations have all already begun to act as a de facto ban on 
the procedure.  
With Erdoğan’s call for at least three children in each family and the party’s pro-active 
push to regulate birth control, the AKP has become more open with its socially conservative 
agenda at the expense of women’s reproductive rights. The party’s brand of social conservatism 
promotes itself as preserving the traditional “Turkish” family, which Erdoğan has explicitly 
alluded to be a nuclear family consisting of at least three children. When I asked Ellialti about 
the structure of this “Turkish” family, she said that she didn’t know but emphasized that the 
concept of family remains a recurring issue that should not be challenged.  
“I have no idea what [the “Turkish” family] is but it’s always you know talked 
about, the structure of Turkish family, this is not good for Turkish family, we 
should be very careful about not violating the limits of you know this. So of course 
[with] the structure of Turkish family [comes] some normative expectations about 
you know how a family should be, how members should behave to each other, and 
who has the power…[Turkey is] stuck in this wanting to be modern and issues of 
late modernity and trying to keep its culture and tradition” (ibid., Ellialti).    
 
Though in its original 2002 manifesto the AKP committed itself to serve as a “bridge between 
traditional and modernizing Turkey” it has become increasingly apparent that the party has only 
upheld commitment on an economic level and to a limited extent on the social level (Mecham, 
2004; 354). Through its actions related to women’s bodies the AKP has positioned women at the 
forefront of the debate to serve as the site where traditional and modern Turkey intersect. When I 
asked Ellialti what was motivating the party’s focus on women’s bodies, Ellialti attributed it to 
the party’s shift toward its socially conservative agenda:  
“Women’s bodies are the primary targets for the state – in this sense women are 
still seen as instrumental [with] their bodies, their reproductivity, and definitely 
[their] motherhood…I think that this population concern [relates] to the rise of 
social conservatism of course…In society we know that the AKP calls itself [and] 
is [a] conservative, democratic party, and they have emphasized this conservative 
aspect of their ideology and politics” (ibid., Ellialti) 
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By directly addressing the bodies of women through reproductive regulations the AKP has 
politicized women’s bodies and the rhetoric of the party is pressuring women to take on static 
roles of mother and caregiver, thus promulgating the secondary status of women. Much like 
Atatürk’s conception of the family is the state, the AKP has framed its rhetoric within a similar 
context by equating women’s citizenry to bearing and raising the youth of the state. In adopting 
this conception that the “family means nation; nation means family” the AKP validates its 
socially conservative position as preserving traditional values (ibid., White, 2003).   
Further supporting Ellialti’s claim and my findings, Professor Çarkoğlu ran a content 
analysis of Turkish political party election manifestos to measure policy positions of parties 
during elections. According to his findings parties from 1950 to present the topic of 
“maintenance and stability of the family” occupied 1.4% of overall content (ibid., Çarkoğlu et 
al., 51). During the 2003 elections, this topic was almost nonexistent in opposition parties CHP 
and MHP, but occupied about 3% of the AKP’s manifesto (ibid., Çarkoğlu et al., 5151). In 
bridging the gap between “population concerns” and social conservatism under the AKP, the 
party’s approach toward regulating the reproductivity of women indicates its focused protection 
of traditional values. In short, the AKP’s efforts to maintain the traditional role of women in the 
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5.9 Labor Laws  
 
Figure 5 shows articles mentioning issues related to labor laws. 
 
The sub-categories under labor laws include initiatives by the government to improve 
participation of women in the workforce; unemployment of women; and the equality of women in 
the workforce. Figure 5 reveals initiatives by the government remained consistently high 
throughout the AKP’s tenure and peaked in 2006 with introduction of the Law on Social Security 
and General Health Insurance (Law 5510). Law 5510 merged different social security systems 
into one and adopted “harmonized legislation” for maternity leave, breastfeeding, and pension, 
which intended to regulate working conditions for women (Müftüler-Baç, 2012;13). However, 
rather than incentivizing women to enter the workforce, Law 5510 inadvertently (or perhaps 
intentionally) pushed women away. Among the problems related to Law 5510 include stringent 
conditions for women’s retirement, which discouraged women from the labor market by taking 
away the “lure of a retirement benefit” (Arat, 2010; 873).  Consequently, Law 5510 gives women 
little incentive to work outside the home if the possibility of a secure pension is unavailable.  
Other problems associated with Law 5510 include the constraints to receive benefits 
based on marital status. Law 5510 also allowed women to benefit from their father’s health 
insurance, which allowed women to be less dependent on their husbands (ibid., Arat, 2010). 
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reliant on a husband. The repeal left single women to choose between limited insurance or to 
find a husband for full insurance coverage.  
Full insurance benefits included in the General Health Insurance Law are access to 
primary health care, dental, in vitro fertilization (IVF), and prosthetics (Family). However, full 
coverage is only available to married couples, and excludes single women and married women 
over 40 (Çarkoğlu, et al., 2012; 44). The constraints of the General Health Insurance Law allow 
women to receive these benefits if and when they marry, assuming all women will take on a 
husband and, in so many words, a family. Similarly single women are restricted from having a 
family without a male partner.  The regulation of ovum and sperm donations, as well as artificial 
insemination is “deemed illegal to be carried out on single, unmarried women, of any age” 
regardless if she is willing to bear the costs (ibid., Çarkoğlu, et al.). Thus, the repeal and state of 
insurance functions to ensure the sanctity of the “Turkish” family is not challenged.   
 Though the intent of these recent insurance laws sought to improve working conditions 
for women, it has also limited the opportunities and benefits available to women in the workforce 
as well as deterred non-working women from entering the workforce. The constraints and limited 
coverage of Law 5510 reflect the party’s endeavor to preserve its normative expectations of the 
“Turkish” family. In a similar vein, the AKP’s position on issues related to labor laws works in 
tandem with the party’s policies related to the physical body. The marital constraints of Law 
5510 pressures women to become more reliant on a male figure. This reliance endorses the 
AKP’s conception of family by promulgating traditional, patriarchal norms. Arat described how 
the party’s two-pronged approach on these issues is attempting to encourage women to take on 
more maternal roles: 
“Social conservatism in relation to women, most explicitly can be seen in their 
promoting this maternal roles for women. Equating womanhood to motherhood. I 
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think that equation is how they go about you know, promoting their social 
conservatism. And they do really nothing about drawing women into the labor 
market, 24% of women are in the labor market, which is ridiculous…They [the 
AKP] don’t push, they don’t pass any laws to push business groups to recruit 
more women, they don’t pass any laws, they don’t bring any incentives they 
didn’t make it, neither use the stick or the carrot to draw women into the labor 
market” (Arat, 2012). 
 
Similar to Law 5510, the 2003 Labor Law No. 4857 intended to encourage women to enter the 
workforce by ensuring equal treatment of employees, however Arat asserts the low rate of 
women in the labor market is a reflection of gender and wage discrimination against women. 
According to a 2012 report from the Directorate General for Internal Policies commissioned by 
the European Parliament’s Committee on Gender Equality, women’s participation in the 
workforce in Turkey is among the lowest of the OECD countries (Müftüler-Baç, 2012;12). 
Although Arat estimated only 24% of women are in the labor market, the Directorate’s findings 
reported only 22.8%, which suggests the rate of women’s employment has declined in recent 
years (ibid., Çarkoğlu, et al).  
Among the problems associated with Labor Law No. 4857, there are several major 
constraints limiting the opportunity for women to enter and develop careers in the labor force. 
First, the absence of early childhood care services forces women to choose either staying at home 
or continuing their careers at the costly expense of childcare. Although the Labor Law requires 
companies with more than 150 women to provide daycare options for children ages 0 to 6, only 
21% of the top 100 employers in Turkey report onsite daycare facilities while the rest either 
outsource of provide part-time services (ibid., Çarkoğlu, et al.). The lack of promised childcare 
services is a major impediment limiting women’s participation in the labor force.  
Second, the social norm of women taking on stay-at-home roles has mitigated the 
responsibility of the father in childcare. This problem is most evident in the lack of support for 
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paternity leave. According to the Labor Law, the maximum amount of time allotted for paternity 
leave is three days; however with lack of regulation, the role of fathers in childcare is completely 
ignored and fathers often receive no time off (ibid., Çarkoğlu, et al.). Though the women who 
choose to continue their careers ask family members for help, those family members are rarely 
male members, and often always mothers, grandmothers, aunts, or female cousins. In addition to 
this, the concept of “stay-at-home dads” does not exist because childcare is considered “a 
women’s issue rather than a family one” (Çarkoğlu, et al, 2012; 45). As a result fathers are left to 
take on the role of breadwinner and the burden of childcare is pushed unto women. It has become 
increasingly evident the AKP is not fully committed to ensuring equality between men and 
women in the workforce. Rather, it appears the party is more committed to preserving traditional 
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5.9a Shifting Toward the Physical Body and Labor Laws  
From the evidence presented above it is clear the AKP has indeed shifted the political 
agenda toward pursuing its socially conservative position. Initially the headscarf controversy 
dominated the party’s agenda for its first two terms. From 2002 to 2008 the headscarf 
controversy was the most salient issue reported within this sample. However, after 2010 there 
was a steep decline in articles mentioning issues related to the headscarf after the AKP 
informally lifted the headscarf ban, which lead to the normalization of the headscarf in society. 
Bolak described covering as more normalized and “fashionable” among “young women and their 
modern ways” (Bolak, 2012). Bolak has observed more women today wearing red and purple to 
stand out and to be “fashionable,” compared to the past when the headscarf represented a 
political symbol and women would choose to wear a mundane beige and long overcoats (ibid., 
Bolak). The meaning of the headscarf shifted from solely being a political symbol to now a form 
of personal expression, whether it be for religious reasons or not.  
In addition to this, the AKP also began publicly stating the headscarf is no longer a 
pertinent issue. In November 2010, President Gül was quoted as describing the headscarf issue as 
“‘unnecessary’ to talk about” and “that Turkey currently had bigger problems on its agenda” 
(“Turkish president says he is fed up with headscarf debate,” 2010). The AKP has publicly 
contended that the headscarf is no longer a pressing issue and signaled it has moved on to other 
points on its agenda. After 2008 the number of articles mentioning the headscarf declined and 
articles mentioning the physical body and labor laws began to gain increased visibility. From 
2009 to 2012 articles mentioning issues related to the physical body and labor laws remained 
consistently higher than articles mentioning issues related to the headscarf, political 
participation, and women’s rights. In short, as the number of articles mentioning issues related to 
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the headscarf controversy began to lose salience and visibility, the number of articles mentioning 
issues related to the physical body and labor laws increased. The shifting salience from the 
headscarf to the physical body and labor laws can be seen as a cause of and caused by the AKP’s 
shifting its political agenda.  
Through this shift, the AKP has become increasingly open in pursuing its socially 
conservative agenda, primarily in terms of preserving the traditional norms and values of the 
family. The recent emphasis on family values has thus brought the status of women into 
question, specifically in regards to the AKP fulfilling its international commitments toward 
improving the status of women. However, the falling-out between the EU and the AKP has 
weakened EU leverage and domestic incentives for accession. Thus, the party has little incentive 
to implement and improve domestic legislation to empower women.  
In addition to this, implementation of domestic reforms by local officials has been 
negated by an overwhelming patriarchal mentality. Consequently this has rendered legal 
channels stifled the efficiency of the law and protection of the individual rights of women. 
Further content analysis of the articles mentioning issues related to the physical body and labor 
laws have show a trend revealing the AKP’s commitment to preserving family over women’s 
rights. Therefore, it can be concluded the AKP is encouraging the secondary status of women 
through attempted legislation that limits opportunities outside the home and pressures women to 
take on maternal roles.  
The AKP’s shift toward issues related to the physical body and labor laws is directly 
affecting women from religious and non-religious backgrounds. While the headscarf controversy 
primarily affected women from religious backgrounds and symbolized a political divergence 
between secularists and Islamists, this shift toward issues related to the physical body and labor 
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laws has lifted the barrier separating religious and non-religious women. Thus this move has 
enabled women from both camps to come together in the defense of women’s rights. These 
developments have further aided in the momentum of the third wave of feminism. 
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5.9b The Third Wave of Feminism: Islamists and Feminists  
Most recently, the attempt by the AKP to ban abortion in 2012 galvanized women from 
religious and non-religious backgrounds to protest against the state. Arat stated she has observed 
more secular women “[making] noise,” as well as more religious women expressing discontent: 
“I know many more Islamist women and girls against this issue were [acting] against [the fact] 
their rights being taken from them” (Arat, 2012). However, few religious women were at the 
forefront of these protests. I asked Arat if she could speculate why these women were not active 
participants in protests, and she responded that perhaps these women felt “secular women are 
doing it anyways so why make life difficult for themselves, and strain their relations to the man 
in their groups” (ibid., Arat, 2012).  Although this statement acknowledges patriarchal norms, the 
choice of religious women to not openly protest against the state should not be presumed as a 
lesser variant of feminism. Rather, it should represent the flourishing cleavages distinct to the 
movement. In other words, religious women are choosing to participate in the movement based 
on their personal ideals and experiences instead of prescribing to a generic movement.  
When discussing this with Ozel and Hilal, they used the example of the “My body 
belongs to me” slogan. Ozel and Hilal observed that for Islamic feminists, or “Muslim feminists” 
as they refer to themselves, this slogan is “not valid” because their “body also belongs to God” 
(Ozel and Hilal, 2012). The intersection between religion and femininity has recreated a new 
identity for Muslim feminists to be a part of the collective feminist movement and to claim their 
bodily rights on their own terms. In supporting the anti-abortion ban, Islamist, and secular 
feminists have merged efforts against state attempts to regulate women’s bodies. Ellialti shared 
similar views stating, “Muslim feminists were against the ban of abortion because they were 
aware that if the ban happens then it will have lots of consequences and implications for women 
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themselves” (Ellialti, 2012). In this sense, a common goal has developed among religious and 
non-religious women to protect their individual rights. Ellialti’s comment illustrates the growing 
sense of solidarity among these women.  
Although most Islamist feminists are not in the streets protesting with secular feminists, 
these women continue to stand alongside them. Professor Bolak observed Islamist women using 
online forums and email networks to stand behind the cause and the secular women in the streets. 
Bolak expressed similar speculations to Arat as to why most religious women choose not to 
actively protest:  
“There’s more a limit to what Muslim feminists can feel, there’s a line they feel 
they can’t cross, but informally speaking I think more, [because] covering has 
become much more normalized, and there’s much more mixing and 
mingling…And so, in the long run I think as more women who use to support the 
AKP, if the PM goes the way he does, becoming more and more authoritarian, I 
think, I will hope that more women are going to bond around their demand for 
more democracy” (Bolak, 2012).  
 
Bolak attributes personal limitations to explain the different channels of protest used by religious 
women, but also emphasizes the growing solidarity among these women. As the headscarf 
became more normalized in society, interaction between religious and non-religious women 
increased. In short, the efforts of religious and non-religious women have coalesced to create a 
new identity within the third wave, which has enabled women from both camps to defend their 
individual rights. The recent developments of the third wave in Turkey have laid a blueprint for 
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Chapter 6 Conclusion and Implications 
Since the reforms of Atatürk, women’s bodies have remained sites of political 
contestation. The emergence of the Islamist movement and increasing public support for 
religious right ideologies once again raised the question of a woman’s status in society.    
From a legislative perspective, the AKP has made great strides in promoting the status of women 
in society. Yet local perspectives offer a more telling picture, as women continue to struggle 
against patriarchal attitudes exuded by the AKP. Though the Copenhagen Criteria empowered 
women’s organizations to push for improved legislation, waning EU incentives and general 
public dissatisfaction with the accession process have left AKP unmotivated to draft new 
legislation. More importantly, the AKP’s dominance has allowed the party to take control of the 
political agenda, enabling the party to pursue its conservative agenda on a social level.  
After the party successfully initiated an informal lifting of the headscarf ban the AKP’s 
focus shifted toward preserving family values and norms via stringent regulations over women’s 
bodies and limited opportunities in the labor force. Though these efforts by the AKP to return 
women to the confines of the home have negatively impacted the status of women, it has also 
brought religious and non-religious women together. Through its dominance and increasing 
authoritarian attitudes, the AKP has provoked a reaction and collaboration of women across all 
identities.  Regardless of religious standing or political preferences, issues related to the physical 
body, labor laws, political participation and representation, and above all women’s rights are 
relevant to all women in MENA.  
As states affected by the Arab Spring begin to move toward democratization, states such 
as Egypt have looked toward Turkey for the next steps. The “Turkish model” is often cited as a 
viable model for economic and political development, and appears to promise greater inclusivity 
	   98	  
of women. However, women in states such as Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya worry the 
democratization process will once again institutionalize patriarchal norms and sideline women’s 
rights. Given the evidence presented in this thesis, the concerns of women in MENA are valid.  
Pınar İlkkaracan, co-founder of the Coalition for Sexual and Bodily Rights in Muslim Societies 
(CSBR), argued against indiscriminately applying the “Turkish model” to unstable countries, and 
instead called on “world citizens, the EU and UN” to support burgeoning feminists movements 
in the MENA region because they will be the “major actors for democratization” (İlkkaracan, 
2012).  
Although the “Turkish model” is problematic in itself, its shortcomings have allowed for 
the further development of the third wave. Given the increasing momentum of the third wave in 
Turkey, the women have already begun to mobilize and break down religious and ideological 
barriers. In a collaborative effort, these women have already begun to work within the 
democratization process to claim their personhood and rights. Though the 2010 constitutional 
referendum was well received and supported by the public, problematic obstacles in writing a 
more democratic constitution have stalled the process.19 Given the AKP remains committed to 
moving forward, it will be interesting to see what role the women of the third wave will play, and 
if the movement will be able to carve out a more inclusive space for religious and non-religious 
women in society and politics.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Currently Turkey is still using the 1982 constitution created after the 1980 military coup d’état. While 
the structure of the 1982 constitution is undemocratic, several key reform packages have amended the 
constitution to be more aligned with EU-requirements. In order to create a more democratic constitution, 
the AKP must pursue radical changes to the constitution. Gunter states these changes must alter “previous 
conceptions” of the constitution, and view citizenship in “civic, rather than ethnic” terms; grant Kurds de 
facto federalism; and allow Kurdish education (ibid., Gunter; 123). Restructuring of the judiciary is also 
necessary, as the judiciary is the only remaining institution of the 1982 constitution that continues to 
uphold its tutelary role. However, because the AKP does not have the necessary two-thirds majority to 
create a new constitution on its own, the party needs to collaborate with other parties such as the CHP, 
MHP, or pro-Kurdish BDP (ibid.,Gunter). Unfortunately, conflicting aspirations among these parties will 
make it difficult to create one cohesive constitution that will fulfill everyone’s requests.  
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The challenges and progress the third wave in Turkey might face will serve as a guide for 
other women within the region; especially those affected by the Arab Spring. With 
democratization still fresh in countries such as Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya, women in these areas 
can turn to the “Turkish women’s movement model” to merge together in a collaborative effort 
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